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Intro 
The world is literally falling apart. Each day brings talk of the end of another multilateral trade 
agreement, treaty, or alliance. Some of this is action: the U.K. and the E.U., the U.S. and the 
T.P.P., and some is posturing: France and the E.U, the U.S. and NAFTA. Nonetheless, it raises 
the question of how one is to feel about these movements of devolution towards political and 
economic isolationism. 
 Seeking an answer, I turned towards Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. As 
Federalists who sought to unite thirteen politically distinct states, they can provide strong 
arguments against devolution. In doing so however, I found a cure to the ill of which devolution 
is the symptom. Specifically, I discovered an example provided by Aristotle of the payments for 
civil service which were instituted in Athens during the reign of Pericles for those who attended 
the Assembly. Though well known, these payments’ capacity to stave off devolution has thus far 
been overlooked. 
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 In a modern twist, I discuss the possibilities for social media to replicate, and even 
improve upon, the Athenian Assembly as it existed under Pericles. Most crucially, it facilitates 
communication, the mechanism by which Aristotle implies attendance at the Assembly can foster 
political unity and avoid devolution. Further, due to its growing popularity, the state need not use 
coercive means to ensure citizens in fact “attend” social media; they need only provide them the 
leisure to do so. 
 In the second half of the paper, I attempt to square my proposal of Periclean payments for 
social media usage with Lockean liberal rights to private property. To do so, I invoke two staples 
of liberal thought regarding property: Locke’s chapter “On Property” from his Second Treatise 
and one contemporary political scientist’s liberal defense of the modern “workfare” state. 
Currently, any payments from the American government to its citizens meant to directly elevate 
their welfare must be based upon receiving reciprocal benefits in return. These are typically 
gained by exacting labor; unless one considers using social media as performing labor, this 
requirement surely dooms my plan. 
 However, I will argue that when we take these two liberal arguments together and view 
them in light of recent economic scholarship, we find that staying true to Locke in fact requires 
transfers of wealth identical to those which enable social media usage. While land was the 
primary point of departure for Locke’s economy, our most valuable resource is not land but 
knowledge. The modern method of production which utilizes knowledge has a name: 
informational capitalism. Because of knowledge’s unique status as a widely dispersed and 
societally-produced non-rival good--as opposed to land--Locke’s ideas on private property must 
no longer be read literally. Instead, their principles must be unearthed in relation to the mode of 
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production which he understood. Only then may we seek to realize those principles by forming 
solutions relevant to our own economy. This is the method I employ.
Abstract
The argument is as follows, with chapter numbers corresponding: 
(I-III): Positive argument--why social media does remedy devolution
I. Providing arguments made by Hamilton and others against devolution for economic and 
political concerns. Showing further evidence that the American Constitution was ratified 
on a notion of community over coherence, the reverse of the principle upholding 
devolution arguments. 
II. Explanation of how Pericles’ payments for civic duty eased social tension by increasing 
communication. Showing why, for practical and ideological purposes, Aristotle approved 
of these payments. 
III. Argument using sociological research to suggest social media usage can provide the 
same benefits to us as the Assembly did for the Athenians. Analysis of an example of 
such a benefit: the removal of the Confederate flag outside of South Carolina 
statehouses. 
(IV-VI) : Negative argument--why transferring wealth does not violate Lockean property rights
7
IV. Affirmation of the efficiency thesis reading of Locke’s property rights by way of 
defeating a common objection. A novel, more accurate redefinition of labor employed to 
do so. 
V. Explanation of the American commitment to the workfare state in which individuals 
must labor in return for wealth transfers from the government. Showing why this 
ultimately relies upon the notion of reciprocity, understood as an exact one-to-one 
correspondence between a state’s giving and taking to any one specific citizen. 
VI. Analysis of Lockean liberalism’s dual commitments to the efficiency thesis and 
reciprocity in light of economic of modern modes of production. Argument that the rise 
of informational capitalism--in which the most valuable resource is knowledge--implies 
political transfers of wealth in order to uphold these preexisting liberal commitments. 
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I. Devolution
On June 23rd, 2016, the United Kingdom voted by popular referendum to leave the European 
Union. On January 20th of the following year, newly-inaugurated American President Donald 
Trump declared in front of the Lincoln memorial: “from this moment on, it’s going to be 
America First,” and subsequently withdrew the U.S. from global trade agreements12. In France, 
presidential candidate Marine Le Pen describes political divisions as “no longer between the left 
and the right, but between the patriots and the globalists,”3 offering her support to the former. 
The “existence” of the French people, she says, depends upon their retreat--like counterparts in 
Britain and the U.S.--from the “tyrannies” of globalization.
 These examples highlight a larger global movement of devolution, the “surrender of 
powers to local authorities by a central government”4. For President Trump, devolution is 
synonymous with a transference of power to the “People.” Through political isolation, he claims 
the United States will make sure every “decision” from trade to immigration, is made solely to 
benefit Americans. Whatever its merit, his plan was popular enough to get him elected. 
 Fever for devolution is not restricted to the Right. In California, an amendment for 
secession is likely to make the ballot in 2019. Leaders of the movement attest that isolation 
would allow the achievement of “progressive” aims like gun control and universal health care. 
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1 "The Inaugural Address." The White House. The United States Government, 30 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
2 Mui, Ylan Q. "Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership Shifts U.S. Role in World Economy."The Washington 
Post. WP Company, 23 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
3 Henley, Jon. "Marine Le Pen Promises Liberation from the EU with France-first Policies." The Guardian. 
Guardian News and Media, 05 Feb. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
4 "Devolution." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
Fever has also spread to the remaining members of the E.U., whose economic and political union 
was formed in 1993; its current president states that many Europeans are “returning to a regional 
mindset,” an unfortunate development in his eyes5. 
i. Economic Implausibility 
Many argue that due to the economic benefits of globalization, and the corresponding need for 
political bodies to enforce adherence to agreed-upon rules between trading states, devolution is 
unlikely to be carried out in practice.  Though nationalistic policies have catchy slogans--e.g. 
Trump’s ”Buy American and Hire American” executive order6--they cannot fulfill what they 
promise without experiencing a decreased level of economic well-being. Rich countries are far 
too used to employing cheap labor and paying low prices for goods produced abroad to turn 
back. In effect, globalization is a “relentless force, difficult to slow, stop, or reverse” (Schaeffer 
12).
 Nayan Chanda, editor of YaleGlobal, a magazine publishing focused on globalization, 
describes the problem as such: “To truly begin deglobalisation, its proponents should throw their 
iPhones, or for that matter any handset in the dustbin because they may not find any model that 
is produced in one country”7. Though devolution is a fine idea, there is a reason globalization 
was pursued in the first place: the economic benefits brought forth by dividing labor between 
nations and trading. Opponents do not acknowledge the necessary economic logic behind 
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5 Spiegel. "Home." Jean-Claude Juncker: The Demons Haven't Been Banished. Trans. Paul Cohen. Pro Europa, 6 
July 2012. Web. 02 May 2017.
6"Presidential Executive Order on Buy American and Hire American." The White House. The United States 
Government, 18 Apr. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
7Chanda, Nayan. "Of Reversing Globalization." Of Reversing Globalization | YaleGlobal Online. ABP Pvt Ltd 
Publication Copyright, 02 Aug. 2011. Web. 02 May 2017
globalization and thus are liable to characterize it as a set of “ad hoc solutions,” contingent upon 
political will and liable to be reversed through policy. What they fail to realize that while citizens 
may indeed support devolution in theory, they are unlikely to support of the impacts it has on 
their wallets. As to devolution’s growing popularity nonetheless, “the facts,” Chanda writes, 
“seldom stand in the way of a catchy slogan” (like Buy American). 
 Great Britain’s actions following its “Brexit” from the E.U. provide a cautionary tale.  
Premised on economic nationalism, Brexit is nonetheless likely to result in another free-trade 
agreement with the E.U., similar to the one already in place. Swedish economist Fredrik Erixon 
comments: 
Economic logic may not be a good basis for predicting policy in this age of growing economic nationalism, but 
we’re not talking about a complex, labyrinthine Sykes-Picot endeavour. The task for trade negotiators now is to 
avoid a collapse of current trade, not to break up markets for new trade.8 
Despite political support for economic and political isolation, its full implementation is likely to 
be tempered by concern for preservation of the status quo, itself a result of past globalization. 
Politically and rhetorically isolated, countries will remain economically dependent, lacking 
institutional structures to further coordinate towards shared goals: “no more common standards 
for consumer and environmental policy or joint rules for farm subsidies and state aid to 
industries”.9  While trade is preserved, inescapable political issues surrounding it are left 
unaddressed. This includes decisions both strategic: “policy makers would set their country’s 
tariffs at the noncooperative levels identified by the static Nash equilibrium,” and ethical: “An 
example of a local concern for market outcomes in other countries arises when citizens disdain 
11
8 Erixon, Fredrik. "Britain and the EU Probably Will Reach a Trade Deal. Here's Why." The Spectator. N.p., 29 Mar. 
2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
9 Erixon, Fredrik. "Britain and the EU Probably Will Reach a Trade Deal. Here's Why." The Spectator. N.p., 29 Mar. 
2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
the use of child labor, even if it occurs outside the borders of their country” (Grossman 6,16)
(emphasis mine). So long as citizens seek to avoid a general decline in wealth, it is unlikely full 
devolution will be carried out. Insofar as economic ties remain, political ones will be necessary 
to achieve optimal output and address ethical concerns. 
ii. Ideological Danger
Not only is devolution unlikely to be wholeheartedly pursued, leaving trading nations without 
much needed political safeguards, but its pursuit is an ideological danger as well. Its 
implementation increases instability both by setting an anti-democratic precedent and by the very 
nature of the smaller nations it creates. This was understood by noted globalists like the 
Federalists, who supported the ratification of the Constitution and unification of thirteen states 
under one federal government, and Abraham Lincoln, who sought to revive political ties between 
the North and South. 
 Devolution sets a precedent that is antithetical to the formation of democratic political 
community. Describing his own effort fighting devolution, Abraham Lincoln said the Union 
soldiers who fell at Gettysburg “shall not have died in vain,” for their victory ensured “that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”10 His 
conclusion, democracy perishing, far outweighs any actual immediate consequences of the 
South’s secession. Democratic governance would in theory reign in both nations, albeit 
separately. However, Lincoln is aware that once society’s commitments to its factional interests--
in this case slavery--are allowed to outweigh its commitments to political unity, the very 
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10 "The Gettysburg Address." The Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln. Ed. Roy P. Basler. Abraham Lincoln 
Online, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
possibility of democratic community, premised as it is upon a privileging of unity amongst 
difference, is doomed. 
 California provides an example of this principle at work: as some seek secession from the 
U.S., others seek secession from each other. The National Review’s John Fund writes: “Let the 
sprawling, diverse state divide up into two or more states to ease tensions between farmers and 
coastal types, defuse the war of ideology between Left and Right, and allow more policy 
experimentation” 11. Similarly, John Adams once remarked that a “simple government” must “of 
necessity split into two parties,” no matter its initial homogeneity (Adams 292). However, if we 
dissolve government each time such a split occurs, democracy will forever find itself in a 
precarious position, liable to “perish from the earth.”
 Along with these effects on stability, devolution also creates instability by leaving smaller 
political bodies in its wake. James Madison writes in Federalist number ten: “Extend the 
[political] sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens” (Hamilton et al. 78).  In contrast, a smaller political body makes it more likely that a 
majority of individuals may be motivated by the same interest, allowing them to control the arms 
of state power without regard for others. A larger body tends to a greater diversity of interests, 
meaning a majority is likely to only be gained through coalition-building. This makes it less 
likely that all members of the majority have an interest in “invading the rights” of particular 
citizens. By protecting citizens‘ rights, a larger state makes it less likely that ideological 
dissension will lead to complete political revolt.                                                                                 
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11Fund, John. "California Shouldn't Secede from the U.S." National Review. NRO, 29 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
 Similarly, Aristotle writes that “large states are less liable to faction than small ones, 
because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the 
citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor and to leave nothing in the middle”(Aristotle 
108). Once again, a populace increased in size tends to stability. Within, interests are not 
concentrated on two sides who are each ready to deprive the other of their rights as soon as they 
gain power. Instead, a third interest arises which in order to gain power must build a coalition 
with one of the two sides. By doing so, the interests of each side is diluted, making it unlikely 
that power will be abused, insofar as the middle class has an interest in preserving the body 
politic. Thus increased size and the diversity of interests it engenders tend to stability by diluting 
the interests of radicals which, if they were to be carried out, would likely lead to the dissolution 
of the government due to the illegitimacy of its invasion of rights.
iii. History 
a. Madison
All of this was well understood by America’s first globalizers, the Federalists. These men--
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay--south to persuade the populace to ratify the Constitution, thereby 
forming a union of the thirteen states under a powerful federal government. They affirmed in 
their writings the primacy of forming political community over achieving ideological coherence 
within that community. This contrasts with contemporary devolution activists who seek 
ideological agreement, whether it be “progressiveness” in California or “Frenchness” under 
Marine Le Pen. The Federalists’ primary concerns were the practical benefits of forming an 
increased community, and they expressed this interest politically by emphasizing the importance 
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of community as a good in itself. They did not stake its desirability to its measure of ideological 
coherence, progressive or not.
 In Federalist number sixty-two, Madison finds himself defending the equal representation 
give to all state within the Senate. Critics found this institutional design bewildering in light of 
their commitment to a “one man one vote” democracy in which “one person’s voting power 
ought to be roughly equivalent to another person’s”12. Under Senate rules, voters in small states 
have their influence amplified in the Senate, whereas voters in large states have theirs divided 
amongst larger constituencies, decreasing their power. Why shouldn’t this commitment apply to 
representation within the Senate? The Founders are charged with incoherence: formal they have 
representative equality between citizen out the window in favor of a substantive representative 
equality between unequal states. For his part, Madison explains that due to practical interests, 
finding agreement, and building community, was more important than that community 
expressing ideological coherence.
 For Madison, a common government--replete with powers “equal to its objects”--is 
“called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America”(Hamilton et 
al. 375). The nation calls for a unified government not as a token gesture, but in pursuit of gains 
to be had through increased power. If the “object” of his statement is the thirteen states already 
engaging in trade across their borders, the political power “equal to” it is the ability to regulate 
this trade. The “voice” of the people clamor for political integration through their economic 
actions--pursuing commerce and relations across borders. A legal framework is necessary to 
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12 Anonymous. "One-person, One-vote Rule." LII / Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School, 19 
Aug. 2010. Web. 02 May 2017.
preserve this interstate commerce when disputes necessarily arise between traders or those 
affected by traders’ activities.  
 Achieving unanimous agreement between states on the ratification of the Constitution 
faced a hurdle by way of the “one man one vote” principle. Its complete application would 
require smaller states to consent to signing away their sovereignty to a body in which their 
interests would always find less representation than that of their fellows. Madison writes on the 
topic that “A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states 
[i.e. one man, one vote] is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States” (Hamilton et al. 
375). The Constitution’s drafters thus found themselves in a dilemma: remain ideologically 
coherent and lose the membership of the smaller states, or achieve the creation of community, 
compromising principles along the way. They chose the latter. 
 Madison describes the compromise over congressional representation as powered not by 
“theory” but “a spirit of amity,” expressed in participants’ “mutual deference and 
concession” (Hamilton et al. 375). In other words, community took precedence over coherence. 
While the institutional structure is sub-optimal as viewed from each parties’ point of view--larger 
states want proportionally equal representation, smaller states want substantively equal 
representation--the fact that a common structure exists is better than none at all, or one only 
encompassing some states. The decision to compromise on principle is the decision to embrace 
the “lesser evil”: “The only option...lies between the proposed government and a government [or 
lack thereof] still more objectionable” (Hamilton et al. 375). Tellingly, Madison deems this an act 
of “prudence,” a word whose connotation of practicality reminds us that at the heart of the 
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founder’s conviction is not a coherent ideological position, but a real-life hungering for the 
economic benefits of community.
b. Hamilton
For the anti-Federalists, the incoherent position taken by the Constitution’s founders in order to 
achieve unanimous support “only proves, that we cannot form one general government on equal 
and just principles” and thus that “we ought not to lodge such extensive powers” within a central 
government at all(Farmer 10). If a community cannot express coherence in its principles of 
justice, they argue, then that community is unwarranted; community should only exist for the 
sake of expressing a principle of justice. Though this is not the position held by the Founders, the 
anti-Federalists can be excused for thinking it is; Hamilton himself provides evidence for their 
claim. 
 The Constitution’s drafters, Hamilton writes, were to determine “whether societies of 
men are capable...of establishing good government from reflection,” or whether they are slave to 
“accident and force,” seemingly privileging theory and reflection over materiality and accident 
(Hamilton et al. 27). He seems to be expressly endorsing the value of coherence above all else, 
speaking as if coherence were the ultimate goal, and the founders the first humans to attempt to 
achieve it by adopting poses of reflection. Thus it would seem that insofar as the Constitution 
expresses incoherence he would consider it invalid as it goes against the fundamental ethos of its 
drafters. However, Hamilton goes on to show that the reason being employed by the Founders 
through “reflection” is not myopic, judging the rationality of each law by itself, but contextual, 
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viewing the document as a whole in light of numerous reasons favoring the adoption of any 
constitution at all. 
 He describes constitutional deliberators as having had “many particular interests” which 
created “prejudices little favorable to... truth”(Hamilton et al. 27,28). If that were the case, and 
coherence the ultimate goal, it would seem reasonable to exclude those biases which preclude the 
attainment of truth, only taking into account those that do not. At the very least, others could 
attempt to persuade those who are prejudiced of the errors of their ways. This position is taken 
by the anti-Federalists, who only seek to “induce” the “sensible and virtuous part of the 
community” to agree to their laws, suppressing resistance from the rest (Farmer 7). However, 
Hamilton denounces this strategy on two grounds: the innocence of those who are biased, and the 
inevitability of bias itself. 
 Of those who hold prejudiced positions in relation to the Constitution, Hamilton writes:
...much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from the 
sources, blameless at least if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and 
fears. So numerous indeed and powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, 
upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first 
magnitude to society. (Hamilton et al. 28)(emphasis mine)
Here he is making two moves. First, he proclaims the innocence (“blameless...honest errors”) of 
those who hold biased positions, making their exclusion by the anti-Federalists rather suspect. 
Though we may attempt to show the biased their mistakes, it seems very anti-democratic to 
dismiss a portion of the population for an action of which they are blameless. Second, he 
problematizes the appearance of bias. If both “wise” and “good” men often fall prey themselves 
to bias, how are we--the spectators--to conclude who is biased and who is not. Its like attempting 
to bet on the results of a weightlifting competition and learning, during your inspection of the 
participants, that muscles do not help one to lift weights. Our usual heuristics of judgment--
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wisdom means one is not prejudiced towards the truth, or muscularity means one can lift 
weights--are no longer operative. While the weightlifting bettor may get around this problem by 
betting randomly, Constitutional deliberators do ultimately need to decide whose plan to follow 
and whose to ignore. Without the strict command of: follow these men, they are wise and thus 
provide truth, deliberators are hard-pressed to discover the absolute truth on each and every 
constitutional decision. 
 Thus we find that bias is both inevitable, blameless, and liable to befall even the most 
honest of deliberators. In consequence, it is difficult to spot: its beholder is not marked by any 
deficit that others do not share. With this in mind, it is clear that the Founders’ “reflection,” 
which Hamilton refers to as guiding their deliberations, is directed towards the Constitution as a 
whole, not each of its individual parts. Were it not, agreement on any single law would be close 
to impossible; some would declare it truth, others falsity. Instead, deliberators’ reflections reveal 
to them the rationality--in light of this ontological status of bias--of viewing the Constitution as a 
whole. More than a set of rules for defining justice, it is a measure towards building community.
The benefits of community are simply too great, and the pursuit of truth too fraught, to think 
otherwise. The question is not: “do each of the Constitution’s clauses expresses a uniform idea of 
justice?” but rather “is the incoherence expressed within the Constitution’s idea of justice 
devastating enough for us to forego the immense benefits of forming a common sovereign?” For 
Hamilton and Madison, at least, reflection tells us “no.”
iv. Conclusion
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In this chapter, I argued against global movements towards devolution on three grounds. First, I 
explained that movements away from globalization have to contend with the fact that their 
political positions will almost certainly injure citizens’ economic well-being. Because of this 
fact, I argue, devolution is unlikely to be carried out in practice, amounting to no more than a 
token gesture and a catchy slogan. As an example, I pointed to the U.K.’s decision to sign a trade 
agreement with the E.U. after its exit from the association. Attempting to retain their legitimacy, 
they restrict the terms of trade to a minimal set of rules, leaving them unprepared to deal 
politically with problems which arise such as externalities, disputes between traders, or citizen’s 
ethical concerns. They are not any less entangled with other nations, just less prepared to deal 
with the issues entanglement brings. 
 Second, I argued that devolution creates instability in two ways. For one, it sets a 
precedent that individual interest in some good may override the common interest in remaining 
unified politically. Once out of the bag, this cat is hard to stop. Thus Abraham Lincoln viewed 
the South’s secession as not just an act of betrayal and an end to the American Union, but a step 
towards the evaporation of democracy from the face of the earth. For another, devolution leaves 
smaller political communities in its wake. Smaller communities, for both Aristotle and the 
Federalists, are more liable to instability. For them, a nation is unable to retain stability when 
only two factions exist: each will continually gain power only to use it to invade the rights of the 
other, who previously did the same to them. Thus they urge the adoption of a larger state for, as 
John Adams noted in his defense of the Constitution, “The United States of America calculated 
their governments for a duration of more than ten years”(Adams 298). 
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 Finally, I showed that the Federalists expressed a preference for globalization by 
affirming the primacy of forming community over achieving ideological coherence. This is 
important because many present calls for devolution base their claims on a pursuit of coherence, 
whether it be “progressiveness, “French-ness” or “America first-ness.” Faced with a choice 
between upholding the principle of “one man one vote” or sacrificing this principle to gain the 
consent of smaller states to be ruled, the Founders chose the latter. As they acknowledge, they 
were not going to let “theory” get in the way of the “voice” of the people which called for a 
dominant sovereign to regulate commerce between themselves. Unlike the Brits, who follow the 
economic interests of their citizens in signing a free-trade deal with the E.U., while indulging 
their political fantasies by foolishly relinquishing the power to coordinate in the regulation of this 
international trade, the Founders acknowledged the practical interests of their people  and set 
about forming a reasonable political structure to further them. 
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II. Pericles’ Payments
In the previous chapter, I ended by showing the American Founders’ commitment to community 
over coherence; for them, the end of political deliberation is finding agreement, not expressing a 
coherent ideal of justice. However, a devolutionist can short-circuit this argument by claiming 
that if participants’ ideas of justice wildly diverge, any government they are capable of founding 
will be ineffective for carrying out the will of the people--the people’s will will too confused.  
 For example, though the U.K. relinquished its ability to regulate international commerce 
by leaving the E.U., perhaps that is better than the limited regulation it was able to influence as a 
member of the E.U. In essence, the argument is that while forming community is economically 
beneficial, those benefits can be minimal if the individuals forming community are too 
ideologically diverse, creating stifled and ineffective governance. 
 However, as I will show, the Federalists encountered this claim as well, finding it 
unconvincing. Both sides of the debate--the Federalists’ and their opposition--founnd support 
from the work of Baron de Montesquieu, an influential political theorist of the time. However, 
Montesquieu himself ultimately affirms that while ideological diversity can hinder the work of 
governance, this hindrance can be overcome through increased communication. Through 
vocalization, citizens’ diverse interests become objective, and thus able to be viewed 
dispassionately alongside the vocalized interests of others. Communication makes each citizen 
more able to alter their own interests in response to others’ by making clear to them their own 
subjectivity; it is hard to maintain a notion of oneself as a sole purveyor of truth when 
encountered with the truth as it is understood by other equally rational creatures. The solution to 
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ideological diversity within a community, then, is not to disband that community for fear of 
intransigent government, but to allow citizens a greater amount of political speech--thereby 
pushing the community towards a more unified ideology and resulting effective governance. 
i. Diversity Stifles Governance: Montesquieu’s Size Requirement
In a letter dated October eighteenth and addressed the to “Citizens of the State of New York,” 
one writer employing the pen name Brutus cites French political theorist Baron de Montesquieu 
to criticize the proposed Union for its unwieldy size. In the opinion of the “wisest men who have 
ever thought,” he writes, “a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense 
extent13”(Brutus 8). For Montesquieu, the “interest of the public14” becomes increasingly opaque 
as a nation grows in size. Accordingly, citizens feel their interests are at odds with those of their 
compatriots: if an interest is not shared, it is in competition. They begin to feel they can 
“raise...to grandeur on the ruins of [the] country,” a thought disastrous to any form of 
government(Brutus 8). Furthermore, due to democracy’s reliance upon citizens’ ability to “all 
come together to deliberate,” its authority must be restricted “to such bounds as that the people 
can conveniently assemble”(Brutus 9). Thus he concludes it is not “practicable” for a country so 
“large and numerous” as the United States to elect representatives which will “speak their 
sentiments” without their number thereby becoming “so numerous as to be incapable of 
transacting public business”(Brutus 10). “A free republic,” therefore, simply “cannot long 
subsist” over a nation “of the great extent of these states”(Brutus 13). 
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13 “It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsists”(Montesquieu 124).
14 “In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends 
on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more with the reach 
of every citizen; abuses are of less extent”(Montesquieu 124). 
 Responding to his detractors’ circulation of the “observations of Montesquieu on the 
necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government,” Alexander Hamilton, writing 
under the name Publius, finds two faults in their argumentation(Hamilton et al. 68). The first is 
perspectival: for Montesquieu, the smallness  “natural” to republican government was “of 
dimensions far short[er than] the limits...of almost every one of the States” (Hamilton et al. 68). 
To follow his logic, then, we would be forced to reject not only the Constitution, but the pre-
existing constitutions of each of the thirteen states-- surely not what Brutus had in mind. The 
second is contextual. In the same work, The Spirit of the Laws, Hamilton notes, Montesquieu 
states that in a confederate republic, where “several smaller states agree to become members of a 
larger one,” the  benefits of a democratic government can be reconciled with the executive 
powers of a monarchy(Hamilton et al. 69). This arrangement preserves the representation of a 
republican government15, while allowing the sovereign--through creation of a centralized 
executive---to act, when necessary, swiftly and as one16. He concludes that Brutus fails to 
accurately represent Montesquieu, instead providing his own “novel refinements to an erroneous 
theory”(Hamilton et al. 71). Consequently, Brutus fails to prove the alleged necessity of rejecting 
the proposed constitution (Hamilton et al. 71). 
 While Hamilton successfully shows that Montesquieu’s size requirement is irrelevant to 
the question at issue, he fails to address a more pressing claim upon which his opposition is 
rooted. This is the claim that as a nation grows beyond its original bounds, it becomes more and 
more difficult to discern what is in its “public interest.” A legislature composed of representatives 
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15 “The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent 
parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representative in the Senate”(Hamilton et al. 71). 
16 “‘[A confederate republic] is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by 
means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the 
united body”’(Hamilton et al. 69). 
whose “manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions,” anti-Federalists 
argue,  is run by such “heterogeneous and discordant principles” as to render it ineffectual(Brutus 
10). Rather than pursuing common goals, legislators would be “constantly contending with each 
other”(Brutus 10). This claim finds familiar support: Montesquieu remarks that as the “character 
of the spirit and the passions of the heart [of men]” differ according to climate, so too should 
laws ”be relative to the[se] differences”(Montesquieu 231). Though a centralized government 
does possess the advantages of monarchy in expanding its territory and providing for defense, it 
is still threatened with a loss of authority as it incorporates new lands and peoples whose ways of 
life differ from those expressed in the state’s pre-existing laws. Too much diversity in 
incorporation, and the citizenry loses that shared sense of goodness which allowed it to function 
effectively. 
ii. Aristotle’s Positive Feedback Loop of Democracy
Montesquieu’s conviction that a state must express a coherent ideal of goodness to function is 
found in Aristotle. “A state exists,” he wrote in his Politics “for the sake of a good life, and not 
for the sake of life only”(Aristotle 73). For him, the state is not only a negative set of restrictions 
upon its peoples, but a positive force working towards bringing about the ideals embodied in 
their state. For example, Sparta makes its citizens war-like, Athens makes them political. Without 
an ideal to pursue, a state becomes a “mere society,” the same as that which “slaves and brute 
animals might form”(Aristotle 74,73). Man’s unique ability to reason, and thereby form notions 
of the ideal, means his society need not only work towards his survival--as any collective of 
animals would do--but also towards his ideal of justice.
25
 With this consideration in mind--the necessity of ideological consensus among citizens 
for the state to express a coherent ideal and become more than a mere association--Aristotle 
argues that “such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place,” 
and attend “amusements which draw men together”(Aristotle 74-75). For him, intercourse and 
the feelings of mutual concern it instantiates between citizens is a necessary component of 
finding mutual interests and founding a political society. Unlike Montesquieu, however, he 
provides no express restriction on the society’s eventual size after this establishment. In fact, he 
assumes a well-run state will outgrow its humble, community-based beginnings and become 
something larger--as is to be expected from the man who believes the “end of a thing is the 
best”(Aristotle 13). The successful political society, once forged out of familial bonds, outgrows 
these fetters to become self-sufficing, relying upon no other contingent facts--such as citizens’ 
location--besides its own existence: “to be self-sufficing is the end and the best”(Aristotle 13). 
Democratic community becomes detached from its progenitor, mutual ideology, to become a 
self-sufficient creator of its own mutually-held ideology. 
 This enlarged state, however, which has “outgrown [its] original size” and had its 
“revenues...increased,” does not maintain its sense of community by accident: “out of...necessary  
causes,” it shifts its administrative form to a new “kind of democracy”(Aristotle101). Aristotle 
explains: 
“...when cities have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens have a place 
in the government, through the great preponderance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor who receive 
pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the administration.”(Aristotle101)(emphasis mine)
The enriched state compensates for an increased diversity of peoples and interests by paying 
those peoples to speak for themselves, “exercising their rights” to share their interests in pursuit 
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of favorable administration. It puts some of the practical gains had from globalization towards 
easing the ideological dissension which globalization has brought along with them. This process 
I will term the positive feedback loop of democracy: as the state grows in size and wealth due to 
its pre-existing unified conception of goodness and resultant effective governance, it loses that 
sense of community upon which that particular idea of goodness was forged. At the same time, it  
uses this increased wealth, providing payments to the poor for civic duty, to form a larger more 
inclusive political community which, Aristotle implies, will coalesce around its own newfound 
sense of goodness. 
 Aristotle is referring specifically to Athens under the reign Pericles, during which time 
payment for civil service and attendance at the Assembly was instituted. According to one 
historian, “no single other reform furthered democracy as much as pay for service”17. Under this 
system, not only was every citizen formally able to attend the Assembly, but all--because they 
were receiving pay for doing so--had a substantive freedom to do so. Furthermore the Assembly, 
recognized no system of seniority: all citizens could speak, provided they were not subsequently 
shouted down by the multitude. 
 Aristotle himself endorses this move to a fully-enfranchised political society, describing it 
as the “latest in the history of states”(Aristotle 101)(emphasis mine). Given his commitment to 
telos--”the end of a thing is the best”--it is clear that for him the last, or latest, form of a thing 
must be its very best. Also, while discussing various forms of democracy, he states that “a 
council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens,” implying 
that payment for citizens, when the means exist, is the most democratic form of government 
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17Bailly, Jacques A. "Athenian Democracy." Athenian Democracy. University of Vermont, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
(Aristotle 154)(emphasis mine). Finally, in his history of The Constitutions of Athens, Aristotle 
describes the effect of the discontinuation of these payments for the citizenry: oligarchy. He 
recounts that when Athenians became convinced Persia would be more likely to form an alliance 
if they were under oligarchic rule, they elected the council of “the four hundred,” whose first law 
was that “nobody was to receive pay for any office”(Aristotle 233). Effectively limiting the role 
of governing to men of excess wealth, this law established rule by the wealthy. Avoiding debate 
on the relative merits of democracy versus oligarchy, it is clear that if one is committed to 
democracy, payment for citizen’s public participation is the best way to ensure its continued 
existence.
 To briefly recap, prior the ratification of the Constitution, a debate occurred between its 
supporters and detractors on the possibility of the proposed democratic governance being 
effective over such a large and diverse territory. Those opposed to integration, Brutus and the 
anti-Federalists, cited Montesquieu, whose ideas on the topic derived from an Aristotelian 
principle: for the state to exist legitimately, it requires a shared conception of the good among its 
inhabitants.  This allows it to express this ideal legislatively in a coherent set of laws promoting 
the good life as it is thus defined. Given the diversity of both modes of life and of opinion to be 
found within the thirteen states, they argue, reconciliation under one Union is unwise: diverse 
opinions create a conflicted, and therefore stifled legislature, detracting from any benefits 
globalization may bring. 
 However, we have found that Aristotle not only provided for, but encouraged, a 
democratic state’s expansion over new and diverse territories. Putting some of the funds accruing  
to it as a result of expansion towards paying citizens to participate civically, the expanded state 
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enlarges its pool of representatives, vocalizing their diverse interests. In doing so, it ensures that 
an increased diversity of opinions will not necessarily lead to legislative gridlock; providing 
financially for their representation, the state brings newly encompassed interests into 
consideration, eventually coalescing into a new, shared conception of the good.
iii. Communication Breeds Coherence
It is appropriate to ask exactly how a larger, more diverse body of representatives is supposed to 
coalesce around a unified idea of good. After all, Brutus did consider the possibility of increased 
representation, finding it “too numerous to act with any care”(Brutus 10). The difficulty for 
Brutus is not the sheer size of the representative body, but the diversity of opinions held therein. 
Were the latter to decrease, the former would cease to be an impediment. This can be seen from 
the fact that, should groups of representatives agree upon certain principles amongst themselves, 
they could act as a representative microcosm wherein fewer representatives speak for the 
interests of the many, who then agree to support them. 
 The problem is one of reason-responsive change: if deliberators are unable to modify 
their desires in response to those expressed by others, they will remain a “heterogeneous” and 
“discordant” bunch. Conversely, if they are willing to modify their desires, a common solution 
can be found: like a negotiation, the actors begin on opposite sides and gradually come together.  
This would effectively create a smaller, more manageable representative body because there 
would be fewer diverse interests to be represented. For Montesquieu, the answer is 
communication: “the more communicative [a] peoples are,” he writes, “the more easily they 
change their manners”(Montesquieu 311). Through witnessing one another, individuals are more 
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able to recognize the particularity of their own desires: “because each man is...a spectacle for 
another...one sees the singularities of individuals better. The climate that makes a nation like to 
communicate also makes it like to change”(Montesquieu 311). By communicating, individuals 
are forced to confront the fact that their own good is not yet an objective good capable of 
founding a state. Thus it requires modification--in response to others’ good-- for it to become so.
 If Montesquieu is correct, Aristotle’s extension of the deliberative body is itself enough to 
provide for the conception of a new, more inclusive good in response to a new, more inclusive 
state. The means by which representation is increased--payments providing citizens the leisure to 
attend debate--simultaneously engenders increased communication by placing citizens within a 
common space--the Assembly--and within earshot of one another. Attendance at political 
discussion thus replaces what was for Aristotle once the function of “amusements”: establishing 
community 18. With this in mind, we can expand our model of the positive feedback loop of 
democracy. As the state grows in size, and correspondingly wealth, it puts some of that wealth 
towards providing citizens the leisure to partake in political deliberation. As the number of 
deliberators grows, the various conceptions of the good held by members of the state become, 
through their verbal presentation, increasingly evident to the deliberative body, making them 
available for incorporation into the common good.  All that is required from citizens themselves 
is a commitment to avoiding the community’s splintering, adopting a position of flexibility 
towards their own interests in response to others’.This should be forthcoming irrespective of a 
commitment to democratic community, because--as both Aristotle and Nayan Chanda mention--
globalization is always in the citizenries’ economic best interest.
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18 (Aristotle 74-75)
iv. Benefits of Increased Enfranchisement
Aristotle viewed Pericles’ increased enfranchisement positively for other reasons as well. This 
can be gleaned from his Politics. He writes, for example, that “true forms of government” are 
those which govern according “to the common interest,” opposing this to the private interest, 
“whether of the one, of the few, or the many”(Aristotle 71). A government, to be legitimate, must 
prior to acting discern those interests which are common to its citizens. Contemporary political 
theorists Josh Cohen and Archon Fung share this conviction, writing that in “a deliberative 
democracy...laws and policies result from processes in which citizens defend solutions to 
common problems on the basis of what are generally acknowledged as relevant reasons”(Cohen 
and Fung 4)(emphasis mine). This is contrasted with popular problems that affect the majority, 
but not the whole. While commonality seems to be an impossibly high bar to set for an issue to 
become available for political discussion, we should keep in mind that an interest need not be 
directly had by all citizens, but that citizens need only have an interest in someone whom that 
interest does affect. In contemporary culture, this amounts to just about everyone for, as Philip 
Kitcher notes, “given the technological possibilities for violent retaliation now increasingly 
available to the poor and oppressed,” it becomes in the interest of all to  to satisfy the rights of 
marginalized groups(Buchanan and Powell 17). Placing citizens within a common space, a la a 
Periclean assembly, does the exact same thing: when all citizens have the ability to invade one 
another’s  personal space with speech or action, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to ignore 
their concerns. Attempting to assuage these concerns through negotiation thus becomes the 
optimal route of action because ignorance is no longer an option.
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 Clearly, this awareness of what is a common interest cannot be performed a priori, but 
requires knowledge of all citizens’ actual desires; hence the distinction between the many and the 
common--government cannot appeal to a utilitarian logic. By aiding the citizenry in the 
expression of their desires, increasing their political speech, Aristotle makes this task of 
discerning what is common easier. Further, finding a commonality of interests can have practical, 
strategic benefits for society as a whole. Discussing the arts, Aristotle claims that “the many are 
better judges [of merit] than a single man.” While “some understand one part, and some 
another,” through combination they are able to “understand the whole”. Whether this principle 
applies to democracy, he admits, “is not clear,” but contingent upon the make-up of the 
deliberative body assembled. Contemporary democrats Cohen and Fung agree, noting  that 
“some radical democrats argue that a more participatory and deliberative democracy would be 
better at solving practical problems,” concluding that “nothing [they] say is intended to dispute 
this proposition about practical advantages” (Cohen and Fung 2). Regardless, to the “mass of 
freemen” must be accorded “some deliberative and judicial functions” in order to avoid 
dissension: “a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of 
enemies”(Aristotle 76-77). Thus universal enfranchisement provides two practical benefits, one 
certain and one probable. By including the masses in deliberation, it helps gain their 
acquiescence to any subsequent exercise of power, diminishing dissension. Simultaneously, by 
increasing the quantity of political speech, it offers the possibility of better political solutions, 
just as “a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single 
purse”(Aristotle 76). 
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v. Conclusion
The anti-Federalists, fretting over Montesquieu’s concern that a proposed Union would be too 
vast for a democratic constitution, fail to pay heed to this idea’s progenitor--Aristotle. Had they 
done so, they would have discovered two responses to their worry. First, although a democratic 
government initially arises from communal bonds and mutual feeling, it is natural--and  indeed 
beneficial--that it outgrow these bonds to encompass a greater amount of land and people. This is 
in line with Aristotle’s belief in telos: through the expansion of successful states and the 
contraction of failed ones, the map is redrawn.  Second, the dissension that threatens a 
democracy during its attempt to expand can be remedied through administrative reform: 
providing citizens with the leisure necessary to perform political speech attacks both the social 
and political causes of unrest. Socially, it eases tension by preventing the poor from becoming 
“enemies” of the state through their inclusion in the state apparatus. Politically, it makes it easier 
to discern the common good, allowing a state, in Aristotelian terms, to be formed.
 Returning to our initial discussion on devolution, its proponents have been defeated once 
again. Whereas I previously showed that devolution is undesirable, here I showed that 
devolutionists’ primary concern--that their current governing structure is too ideologically 
diverse to represent their interests effectively--can be remedied by increasing political speech. 
Further, this method is endorsed by Aristotle, whose idea of the state aligns with devolutionists’ 
in that it begins with ideological coherence. Unlike devolutionists, however, Aristotle recognizes 
the benefits of territorial expansion; instead of political deconstruction, he encourages states 
follow the lead of Pericles and institute payment for civil service. By doing so, Pericles was able 
to maintain unity during periods of increased diversity, capitalizing on globalization’s economic 
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benefits to do so. Thus, given the clear undesirability of devolution, the question becomes: how 
can Pericles’ Assembly--and the ideological coherence it brings about-- possibly be realized in 
modern-day America? 
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III. Social Media and the Athenian Assembly 
Thus far I have shown that devolution is undesirable for its practical as well as its ideological 
consequences.  While its proponents value coherence of ideology over the formation of 
community, this position has been expressly denounced by thinkers in a tradition from Aristotle 
to the Founders of the American republic. Furthermore, I showed that the increased ideological 
diversity which results from globalization, and which threatens to render democratic governance 
ineffective--a worry underlying devolutionist’s concerns--can be remedied through a positive 
feedback loop of democracy. Under this method, some of the financial gains from globalization 
are put towards paying citizens to perform civil service. This increases the overall amount of 
political speech, and makes objective the interests of each constituent in society. This in turn 
places citizens in a more flexible mindset; aware of their own subjectivity, they do not see 
themselves as rigidly representing absolute truth. 
 However, if we are to take Aristotle’s positive feedback loop seriously as a means toward 
remedying broad political disagreement, we must find a way to make operative Pericles’ 
Athenian Assembly for the modern age. Not every aspect must be identical--members need not 
wear togas and sandals--but there are certain aspects which are vital to its functioning as a means 
toward solving disputes. 
 Specifically, if the end of the positive feedback loop is to include the voices of 
marginalized groups in a communal brokering of interests, then the modern assembly must meet 
two requirements naturally following from this end. First, it must be open to all to both attend 
and speak; we are seeking common, not popular, ground. Second, individuals must be able to 
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trade responses with their peers in order to learn in which direction to pivot ideologically to 
achieve greater commonality. In the Periclean Assembly for example, while all were allowed to 
speak, the duration of this speech depended upon its reception by ones peers; if the speech was 
unpopular, the speaker would be jeered until they stopped. In combination, these criteria allow 
for two-way communication to occur between all members of society. This paves the way for 
realization of one’s own subjectivity and subsequent concession of personal interest to the 
interests of others, slowly bringing about ideological coherence. 
 As I will show, social media can provide the platform for this type of discussion. It is 
formally free to all, and attendance could be made possible--just like in the Assembly--by  a 
governmental provision of income allowing individuals the necessary leisure to partake. 
Furthermore, social media allows the kind of back-and-forth between one’s peers and oneself in 
the form of shares, likes, reposts, retweets, etc. All of these are ways of indicating one’s support 
or disapproval of a statement made by another, much like the cheers or boos heard within the 
Assembly. Thus the contemporary analog to Pericles’ payment for civil service is payment for 
social media usage. 
 In this chapter I will provide support for the claims made above regarding social media’s 
ability to function as an Assembly. Then I will provide a specific example of social media 
engendering an ethical change within society which resulted in political action. In doing so I 
hope to show not only that social media is comparable to the Assembly, but that social media--
regardless of this comparison--has proven itself capable already of bringing about greater 
ideological agreement and subsequent political change within the United States. 
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i. Social Media as Athenian Assembly
a. Usage
During oral arguments on the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute banning sex offenders 
from using social media, Justice Anthony Kennedy said that social media sites have 
a “utility” and “coverage” which is “greater than the communication you could ever have had, 
even in the paradigm of the public square”19. Meanwhile Justice Kagan noted their political 
import, stating that because every member of Congress has a Twitter, the platform is a “crucially 
important channel of political communication.” Thus it seems even the nation’s highest court 
shares my conviction that social media is the best analog to the Athenian Assembly as a place to 
meet for political dialogue. However, let’s look more closely into the specifics of its workings. 
 Social media use is widespread, and is only likely to become more so. From 2005 to 
2015, usage increased across all American adults from 7% to 65%20. A majority of 
Americans--62%--reported in 2016 to be getting their news from social media, an increase from 
49% in 201221. One poll--albeit of only 1,000 workers--found that 67% regularly checking social 
media even while at work22. Further, what happens on social media--much like the Assembly--
doesn’t stay on social media, one Pew poll finds that: 
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19 "Packingham v. North Carolina." The Supreme Court 1194th ser. No..15 (2017): n. pag. Alderson Reporting 
Company, 27 Feb. 2017. Web.
20 Perrin, Andrew. "Social Media Usage: 2005-2015." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. Pew 
Research Center, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 02 May 2017.
21 Gottfried, Jeffrey, and Elisa Shearer. "News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016." Pew Research Center's 
Journalism Project. Pew Research Center, 26 May 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
22 Nanji, Ayaz. "How Much Time Do Employees Spend on Social Media at Work?"MarketingProfs. MarketingProfs 
LLC., 29 Sept. 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
Some 14% of workers have found information on social media that has improved their professional opinion of a 
colleague; at the same time, a similar share (16%) have found information on social media that has lowered their 
professional opinion of a colleague23.
Thus, social media is widely used (even when not permitted, e.g. at work) for both consumption 
(getting news) and production (providing information). Furthermore, its effects do not remain 
within the bounds of social media, but overflow into personal life. 
 However, also like the Assembly prior to Pericles, social media usage remains skewed 
towards the privileged even amongst internet users. Pew finds:
Over the past decade, it has consistently been the case that those in higher-income households were more likely to 
use social media...Turning to educational attainment, a similar pattern is observed. Those with at least some college 
experience have been consistently more likely than those with a high school degree or less to use social media over 
the past decade.24
Even while social media usage increases for all, lower-income and less-educated individuals 
remain left out of the conversation. Coincidentally, less-educated individuals split heavily 
towards the devolution-favoring Donald Trump. Perhaps this indicates that their absence from 
social media did in fact lead to communal ignorance of their interests, leading them to seek 
separation from the sovereign structure. Regardless, the solution is the same as it was for 
Pericles: provide leisure through payment. While in Athens they had to ensure each individual 
arrived at the Assembly, only receiving their payment upon doing, we can assume--if the last 
decades’ growth is any indication--that individuals will drive themselves to social media when 
given the leisure to do so. Once there, however, how do they behave? 
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Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. Pew Research Center, 22 June 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
24 Perrin, Andrew. "Social Media Usage: 2005-2015." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. 
Pew Research Center, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 02 May 2017.
b. Possibilities for Dialogue
In a study of self-creation on the internet, Toshi Takahashi reproduces the following quote:  
“Today, without a feel of the social environment (kuuki) or how others may think, it is difficult to be sure if one is 
going the right direction....So, one is always trying to connect with others on social media such as Facebook and 
Mixi, and one is always bothered about the number of followers one has on Twitter. “Does anyone recognize me? 
And do others see me as a valuable person, one who has friends around?” Thus he or she cannot help but care about 
recognition from others” (Takahashi 50).”(emphasis mine)
He goes on explain the mechanism by which this “recognition” occurs: 
While the number of comments or “likes” young people receive shows recognition from others, some people view 
the comments or “likes” that they make on other’s social media content as a form of self-expression and proof of 
self-existence. (Takahashi 48) 
He concludes that individuals growing up in the digital age undergo a mutual, global process of 
recognition and “self-actualization” through the “reinforce[ment] of intimacy” with others via 
digital platforms (Takahashi 49). 
 While we need not share Takahashi’s optimism regarding social media’s effects on 
promoting self-actualization, his account points us towards what makes the platform ideal as a 
space for deliberation. First, it prompts individuals to express themselves in an attempt to gain 
recognition. He quotes one young student who admits: “I guess I use [social media] as a way of 
reminding people that I exist”(Takahashi 47). Like attendees at the Assembly, this student refuses 
to be ignored, posting until he is heard: “I do want to stand out in a way... not by what I post but 
by who I post it to and how often”(Takahashi 47). Further, social media provides not just for 
immediate self-expression, but an active back-and-forth. Sharing one’s opinion of another’s self-
expression is seen as just as valuable a form of self-expression as sharing one’s own. Our student 
for example, searching for recognition, admits he makes “maybe five or ten comments a day. 
Well not even comments, you can also just press like”(Takahashi 47). 
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 These prevalence on social media of these processes--self-expression through speech and 
self-expression as opinion upon another’s speech--render it effective for replicating the kind of 
dialogue found in the Assembly. While all can speak, some may be silenced, others promoted, by 
the reaction of the crowd. In turn, those seeking recognition may alter their speech to accord 
better with the wishes of the populace. However, it is unlikely that in doing so they will lie or 
promote beliefs they do not hold because, as our interviewee notes, they seek recognition as 
whom they believe themselves to be: “this,” he says of his social media profile “is the image I 
want to give people” (Takahashi 47).  It is unlikely blatant dishonesty would be a part of 
anyone’s ideal self-image. 
c. Cohesion
We still need to answer how this global interaction of back-and-forth speech and opinion is 
supposed to bring about the type of ethical change demanded by the need for ideological 
coherence. Following Montesquieu, it is once again a question of an individual’s gaining 
awareness, paying “witness” to another. By recognizing the other, along with the political and 
economic ties that bind one to the other, one is forced to confront the interests of the other, 
providing the grounds for a process of mutual concession. So we ask: does social media allow 
one to confront “the other”? 
 In the same paper, Takahashi describes social media’s ability to introduce one to cultural 
novelties: 
With social media, young people seek and receive information, images, and cultural values which may be different 
from those prevalent in their country or region. The Internet and digital media give them alternative social and 
cultural values that make it possible for them to create a new identity in the global world. (Takahashi 49,50)
(emphasis mine)
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Through its total inclusiveness, social media allows individuals to “witness” cultures with values 
much different than their own. Kathleen Yancey describes this process of witnessing as 
“mak[ing] the familiar strange,” a process able to dismantle “entrenched and unproductive 
pedagogical thinking”(Yancey 8). Her formulation is similar to Montesquieu’s: “because each 
man is...a spectacle for another...one sees the singularities of individuals better”(Montesquieu 
311). Both understand the presence of the “other” as a force leading the individual to confront 
their own singularity. Furthermore, both see recognition of one’s own singularity as a necessary 
precursor to modifying one’s entrenched values. Because social media provides this 
objectification of heretofore unheard interests, presenting them directly to one’s fellow digital 
citizens, it too makes “the familiar strange.” It forces one to confront the “other,” allowing the 
forging of a “new identity” in response.  
 Furthermore, evidence suggests that social media may actually be more effective at 
revealing the “other” than the Assembly ever could have been: one’s search for the “other” on 
social media may have a neurological basis both encouraging and promoting a depth of 
understanding of the “other”. Thomas Parsons writes in his book Cyberpsychology and the Brain 
that: 
Internet searches reflect the ‘seeking’ circuity described by the affective neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp. Our brains 
have evolved to seek out our environments for information that will help us survive....Dopamine is released each 
time one explores his or her environment. Interestingly, the dopaminergic-induced sense of euphoria we experience 
is typically not just a product of a reward, but of seeking itself. For example, a person could decide to do a quick 
Google search to find out what the Japanese word “otaku” means only to find an hour later that one’s quick search 
has lead to an hour of Googling(Parsons 84).
Science aside, the experience of obsessive googling is something we can all probably identify 
with. Importantly, Parsons evokes the idea of a discovered “environment”  surrounding the initial 
search. What follows from that search is not randomness, but a discovery of context; there is 
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always a causal chain at work. While this claim is trivial in that it only implies the existence of a 
search history, we can infer further meaning into it with one reasonable assumption. Specifically, 
web pages one click away from each other--those likely to bring about a prolonged searching 
binge-- are likely have some bearing on each other. If so, as one continuously clicks these links, 
the information which piles up in the form of web pages provides context for one’s initial click.  
As such, Parson’s example continues:
While it only took us a minute to find out that “otaku” is a Japanese term for persons with obsessive interests--
regularly anime and manga fandom--it leads to an hour of dopamine-charged searching for information about its 
contemporary usage, its origination with Akio Nakamori’s essay in Manga Burriko, then to Haruki Murakami’s 
Norwegian Wood, next to the Beatles, then to Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain, and so on (Parsons 84). 
Setting out in pursuit of a simple definition, our protagonist returns with an informal history in 
hand. Notice the import of the information discovered, providing both modern context (its 
“contemporary usage”) and historical significance (“origination”) as well as a group of cultural 
works in which the object of our search can be found.   
 Thus users do actively seek out the “other” on social media. As Takahashi explains, and 
many of us know, information on the web comes from all corners of the earth. Just by not 
purposefully avoiding it, one is certain to come into contact with foreign cultures while surfing 
the net. Further, this knowledge gained of the “other” through social media is not superficial--or 
it need not be--deepening our understanding of their interests and desires. Panksepp contends 
that the very act of searching itself sets in motion further searches as the brain seeks a release of 
dopamine. Because web pages which are linked--allowing the viewer to surf easily from one to 
the other--are likely to be relevant to one another, surfing by its very nature provides context to 
our initial search. 
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ii. Social Media in Action
Having shown theoretical promise, I will now explore social media’s concrete ability to bring 
about modifications to the common good. To do so, I employ the framework for ethical change 
outlined by Philip Kitcher in his book The Ethical Project. Specifically, I utilize his concepts 
concerning proper ethical deliberation to analyze a case study of political change wrought by 
social media: the retirement of Confederate flags outside the South Carolina statehouse. I will 
conclude that social media is an improvement in ethical deliberation due to its ability to present 
facts and mirror opinions: it confronts the entire community with shared facts, as well as other’s 
opinions, and others’ opinions on those opinions. 
 Kitcher’s method is appropriate because of its reliance upon ethical progress as opposed 
to truth25.   As I previously noted, it is the notion of a singular, fixed truth which leads 
devolutionists to favor political isolation over integration. This avoidance of mutual concession 
is a position I hope to avoid. Kitcher’s own position stems from his understanding of ethics as a 
social mechanism meant to provide practical benefits to the community at large: the “original 
function of ethics” he writes, “is to remedy those altruism failures provoking social 
conflict”(Kitcher 223). His understanding parallels that of Aristotle who sees notions of the good 
as underlying a legitimate state. Under both practices, a continuously modified notion of 
goodness undergirds a thereby functioning, rather than conflict-ridden, community. 
 Kitcher defines progressive ethical change as a move to a code which “contains precepts 
enjoining altruism of wider scope or greater range than the code it replaces”(Kitcher 215). By 
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25 In order to distinguish between the relative value of different ethical systems, he writes, “we do not need any 
concept of ethical truth. It is enough to recognize which kinds of changes would be progressive or 
regressive”(Kitcher 210). 
altruism Kitcher means taking into account, and responding positively to, the interests of others. 
Presumably this is the kind of change that is needed for the positive feedback loop of democracy 
to work; it must allow wider swaths of individuals to feel included within the community by way 
of recognizing and responding to their ethical concerns. Thus, Kitcher’s use of wider as opposed 
to better (he explicitly rejects concerns for Darwinian fitness26) provides the perfect blueprint for 
a method of ethical deliberation which does not rely entirely upon pre-conceived notions of 
goodness, for doing so would foreclose the possibility of enlarging democratic community. It is 
instead highly malleable and responsive to the voices of participants, voices which are promoted 
through the positive feedback loop. 
 Under this system, validity of any ethical change must be measured against the validity of 
the process leading to that change. An ideal ethical deliberation, Kitcher argues, takes place 
under conditions of “mutual engagement,” which requires certain stances among its 
participants(Kitcher 343). Among these conditions, two are particularly important: 
1. (KE) In their deliberations, the participants do not rely on any false beliefs about the natural world.
2. (KW) Each participant has complete knowledge of the wishes of others, and of the ways in which these wishes 
are modified through the course of their interactions with one another. 
           (Kitcher 345)
While the first ensures that deliberators are discussing the same object, the latter ensures that 
their ideas are pliable--as per Montesquieu--in response to communication with others. 
Combined, they provide necessary and sufficient requirements for ethical exchanges to occur 
within a deliberative space. 
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26 “Progressive transitions are not to be identified with those promoting Darwinian or cultural success”(Kitcher 213). 
a. The Dylann Roof Case
To discuss the interactions that make up a social network, I will borrow the term “social 
organism” from Oliver Luckett (Luckett and Casey). This “organism” is not restricted to 
traditional heavyweights--Twitter, Facebook, Instagram--but covers any arena where messages 
are exchanged, including chatrooms, message boards, and text boxes that appear alongside other 
media. He calls this an organism to emphasize its similarity to other forms of life: through 
evolutionary fitness, its appearance is constantly in flux. Further, through the social network, he 
contends, the evolutionary fitness of ideas is rapidly put to the test, constantly reforming our 
ideological landscape. This landscape is then reflected back and objectified in that social 
network.  In a powerful example, Luckett highlights the aftermath of Dylan Roof’s attack on a 
Bible study group in Charleston, South Carolina. 
 Despite “growing recognition...that the symbol is offensive to many Americans,”27 the 
Confederate flag has for decades flown outside seven southern state capitols.28 In 2010 it was 
estimated one-third of the African-American community lived under a confederate state flag.29 
Contestation of the issue has not been lacking--a Google search for “fights over confederate flag” 
will bring up such titles as “Fight over Confederate flag ends in criminal charges”, “Fla. man 
struck by wife in fight over confederate flag”, “Brawl Breaks Out in Front of SC Statehouse 
Over Confederate Flag”, and a BBC article entitled “Why do people still fly the Confederate 
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flag” penned two years prior to the massacre--yet political action had only maintained the status 
quo, as it is sometimes wont to do. 
 After news broke of Roof’s crime, along with the discovery of pictures of Roof holding a 
Confederate Flag, the absence of attention which had allowed political movement to stall was no 
longer available. We can only speculate as to why Roof’s crime went viral but, following 
Luckett’s biological metaphor, it was most likely because the story itself perfectly fit well-
developed news “receptors.” That is, it contained two storylines--racism and mass shootings--
which have become “familiar enough to be comprehensible...within cultural comfort 
zones”(Luckett and Casey 99). In the era of Sandy Hook and Black Lives Matter, a misguided 
white youth firing rounds into a crowd of unsuspecting African-Americans serves only to 
continue, not alter, the narrative. Such conformity, found in stories or ideas which allow their 
consumer to remain within pre-existing social mores, is one feature Luckett identifies as favoring 
chances of replication, increasing its evolutionary fitness(Luckett and Casey 99). 
 Another boon to a stories’ reproducibility, as Takahashi predicted, is its novelty (Luckett 
and Casey 99). To become a successful meme [a heuristic containing information spread 
throughout the web], a story must not only have “coherence with a host’s preexisting cognitive 
framework,” achieved through conformity, but must offer something unique to catch viewer’s 
attention(Luckett and Casey 99). By combining two previously distinct issues, namely the 
availability of firearms and the prevalence of racism, this story did just that, taking proven 
ingredients and putting them together in a distinct way. In doing so, it was able to provide moral 
indignation to one’s own living room.   
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 What is the upside to all this? What is the import of a murderous teenage racist becoming 
notable enough to warrant a CNN article asking “Who is Dylann Roof”?30 As I noted, his crime 
took place within an environment--South Carolina--which served as the grounds of an ongoing 
dispute regarding the statehouses’ bearing of the confederate flag. Less than one month after the 
shooting however, that flag came down, ending a fifty-four year run outside the capitol. Despite 
prompting a thirteen-hour debate in the House, final vote tallies were overwhelming: 37-3 in the 
Senate and 103-10 in the House for its removal3132. Ideological coherence was beginning to 
form. State Senator Vincent Sheheen explains the relation between the murder and the 
legislature’s change of heart: 
"When we vote for this bill to remove the flag it won't be because of what happened a couple of weeks ago. But 
what happened a couple of weeks ago opened the eyes of many people in this chamber and many people in this 
state.”33
Many other politicians involved echo that they had their eyes opened. Thus they claim the 
connection between the Confederate flag and racism is a new phenomena. To wit Sen. Joel 
Lourie explains the flag removal as a response its being “used...as a a symbol of hatred and 
bigotry” by the “alleged killer of the Charleston nine,” speaking as if it hadn’t been used as such 
before34. Similarly, speaking to the WSJ, a Baptist priest Bill Feus expresses ambivalence 
towards the removal, admitting he “understand[s]...the Confederate flag has been hijacked by 
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hate groups...but it also represents the flag my kin fought and died under”35. Once again, the 
decision to remove the flag is a response to a new fact, that the flag has been hijacked, and not a 
change of heart on the part of the legislature. Had they been alerted to this fact earlier, it is 
implied, they would have removed it then. Thus they claim ignorance of a long-standing issue, 
making their politicsl action appear an urgent response to an emerging problem. 
 However, as Naomi Shavin of the New Republic notes, “This is an impossible case to 
make”36. Not only is the flag one of only three used by the Ku Klux Klan, but its recurrent 
popular emergence seems to coincide with “challenges...[to the] white supremacist way of life.” 
For example, the flag was first raised over Southern statehouses in the 50’s and 60’s, during 
desegregation and the Civil Rights movement. The possibility that the flag then continued to fly 
for decades due solely to support from white supremacist groups is not so remote when 
considering that according to Euan Hague, a Confederate commemoration scholar at DePaul, 
neo-Confederates “are far from a ‘fringe group’ and in fact have significant support among 
Whites in the South”37. If this is the case, it lends support to the sentiment expressed by social 
worker Yvonne Pygatt to the Washington Post: “This is a proud moment,” she says, “but 
this...should have happened a long time ago.”38 For her, this indeed was a change of heart and 
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not of facts. The legislature, willfully ignoring the problem for decades, only relented under the 
condemning glare of the nation as objectified in social media. 
b. Return to Kitcher
How can we make sense of this change from a Kitcherian point of view? Presumably, the change 
is progressive: it responds to the ongoing ethical concerns of minorities living under a 
confederate flag, while not overstepping the ethical concerns of those who previously supported 
the flag: as they contend, the awareness that the flag was connected to a hate group forced them 
to change their position to one in support of its removal. Thus, the circle of altruism expands, 
without contraction. But how did social media do this? 
 First, it ensured (KE): that the object of deliberation was the same for both parties. 
Previously, the Confederate flag was understood by one group as a sign of hatred, and another as 
a sign of heritage. While the latter may be accused of willful ignorance, there is no evidence to 
support the claim. With the viral spread of the images of Roof alongside a Confederate flag, 
however, willful ignorance can be alleged if they continue to hold onto their conception of the 
flag as a purely historical object. Senator Lourie, in being confronted with this possibility, 
acknowledges the status of the flag as a hate symbol, though is sure to add that it is only the 
images of Roof that alerted him to this fact. Otherwise, he implies, he assuredly would have 
advocated its retirement earlier. Thus, the images connecting racism-fueled Roof to the 
Confederate flag made sure that those who deny a connection between the two can be accused of 
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“rely[ing]” upon “false beliefs about the natural world”--a status no sane politician or citizen 
would hope to portray--alternative facts notwithstanding39. 
 Secondly, social media promoted (KW): knowledge of the wishes of others, and how 
those wishes are modified through their interaction with others’ wishes. This is achieved through 
what Kitcher calls “extended mirroring,” akin to the back-and-forth action of the Assembly 
which I noted earlier. A, for example, becomes aware not only of B’s desires, but of C’s 
assessment of B’s desires, and D’s assessment of C’s assessment of B’s desires and so on and so 
forth (Kitcher 347). When a piece of speech is widely supported or condemned, it goes “viral,” 
as the Dylan Roof story did. Through “sharing,” “liking,” or “retweeting,” one consumes 
information and expresses ones’s response to that information. And it doesn’t end there: 
Facebook allows one to “like” a “like,” and Twitter to “retweet” a “retweet,” allowing a third 
level of assessment. The build-up of all of these diverse opinions responding to each other 
creates what Kitcher terms an “analog of the ‘ideal spectator’”(Kitcher 347). Through its sheer 
volume, this network-wide spectator is able to correct for the biases and distortions of 
individuals. It is analogous to Aristotle’s description of the judgment of the multitude: through 
combination, citizens are able to “understand the whole” (Aristotle 76). 
c. Fake News
One damning charge against social media is that it breeds “fake news.” That is, individuals pen 
sensationalized, unfounded stories, knowing they are likely to be shared. By the time it is found 
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that the stories are false, the damage has been done; readers have mistaken a falsity for a real 
feature of the world. Further, a story’s blatant falsity many times only helps it spread more 
quickly. As per Johnathon Swift: “Falsehood flies, and the Truth comes limping after it”. 
 PolitiFact, a Pulitzer-prize winning, non-partisan site which fact-checks politician’s 
statements, deemed “Fake News” to be 2016’s Lie of the Year40. As they describe the 
phenomena:
 Fake news is made-up stuff, masterfully manipulated to look like credible journalistic reports that are easily spread 
online to large audiences willing to believe the fictions and spread the word.
If, as some claim, fake news is endemic to social media, it would render inoperative our 
requirement for ethical deliberation (KE), that individuals hold only true facts about the world. 
And it seems to be. Google found the problem troubling enough to warrant an alteration to their 
search algorithm, their most valuable asset41. 
 Further, the promotion of fake news has real-world consequences, as citizens then operate 
under false assumptions regarding their shared world. For example, Facebook was recently sued 
by a Syrian migrant to Germany, Anas Modamani, after articles appeared linking him to the 
terrorist attacks in Brussels. Anas had recently posted a selfie with Angela Merkel and, due to his 
“passing resemblance” to one attacker in Brussels, found himself at the center of a social media-
fueled investigation into his whereabouts. As Anas describes, “friends advised that I stay at home 
and avoid going out in public, which I did.”42 Anas was excluded from public life because his 
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peers believed he had committed treason. Albeit not the usual case of fake news, his story 
highlights the dangers of the rapid spread of false belief on social media.
 One particularly concerning area of false news is medical information. As more and more 
Americans seek second, or sometimes first, opinions on the web, it becomes important that the 
decisions they subsequently make are based upon truth. Because of the heightened sensitivity of 
the topic, discussions on stopping false news in the medical realm provide a useful blueprint for 
our own concern of false news at large. In “Rating Health Information on the Internet”, published 
by the AMA, its authors--Alejandro R. Jadad and Anna Gagliardi--come to the following 
conclusions regarding tools to filter out falsity: “It is unclear...whether they should exist in the 
first place, whether they measure what they claim to measure, or whether they lead to more good 
than harm”(Jadad and Gagliardi 611). Their desirability is unclear because some may “view any 
attempt by the academic community...to control the production of information...[as] threatening 
the new level of freedom of expression...that the internet has generated”(Jadad and Gagliardi 
613). In other words, adding stamps of approval will do no more than push the problem back one 
step; if any seal of approval is to work, the individual would have to trust that source, which was 
the problem to begin with. Further, now that citizens have gained their voice by destroying 
traditional gatekeepers through their use of an open internet, they do not want to relinquish 
power to any regulations imposed by experts, as had traditionally been the case. Second, the 
tools may fail to achieve what they claim, evidence of which leads the authors ask rhetorically: 
“is it possible to evaluate information on the Internet?”(Jadad and Gagliardi 613). Given the 
“complexity, variability, and dynamism of the information on the Internet” they state, “any 
attempt to develop instruments to evaluate such information has been and will be futile”(Jadad 
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and Gagliardi 614). Not only is knowledge highly contextual, but any scheme meant to sort 
“fake” news from real news is sure to lead to an arms race wherein “fake” news makers will 
continually tweak their platform to appear real, as they already do (“masterfully manipulated to 
look...credible”). Thus, it seems we are stuck with fake news, with our experts both unwanted 
and unable to help. 
 However, another review of medical information on the web points to a possible solution. 
In “Consumer health information seeking on the internet: the state of the art,” authors R.J.W. 
Cline and K.M. Haynes describe the problem thusly: “Meager information-evaluation skills add 
to consumers' vulnerability, and reinforce the need for quality standards and widespread criteria 
for evaluating health information”(Cline 1). The question being asked in both of these papers--
can quality standards and criteria be developed to sort out false information from true?--is 
understood by these authors as contingent upon the poor “evaluation skills” of consumers. If 
consumers themselves were better able to recognize information supported by fact from that 
supported by falsity, they could self-regulate their own consumption of news, rather than 
instantly devouring all they see. 
 This indeed can be achieved. Pew found in 2012 that American teachers already saw 
teaching students “how to ‘judge the quality of online information’” as a “top priority”43.  How 
can this be done?  One online learning institute believes it is quite simple: “The more time and 
effort students allot researching and evaluating information online, the better they will become at 
selecting reliable, valuable information from trusted authorities and understanding digital 
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functionality.”44 The more one searches the internet, becoming acquainted with its ways, the 
more one is able distinguish truth from falsity. The same goes for the experienced philosopher; 
with time, and recognition of contradictions, she ceases to believe claims immediately and 
instead assumes a skeptical position towards them. Further, because of the flexibility of the 
internet, any top-down scheme is certain to fail as fake news incorporates proposed criteria of 
truth to give itself a false veneer of respectability. Instead, learning how to discern substantiated 
facts from unsubstantiated hearsay is a skill that each individual must learn herself through 
experience. In doing so, the crowd becomes better able to judge on its own, forgoing the need for 
expert guidance.
 Moving back to the Assembly, we find a similar grassroots method in play of deciding 
truth. Despite the prevalence of aristocrats, under Pericles it was the people who ultimately made 
decisions, with magistrates simply presiding over the process. Classics scholar Josiah Ober notes 
that under Pericles “Athens was in fact ruled by the demos. Neither the orators nor the critics of 
democracy defined demokratia as a system wherein the citizen masses were effectively taught or 
guided by a benevolent, historically-minded elite”(Ober 85). Power was given to the people in a 
non-trivial way and they were expected to wield it wisely, their multitude filtering out those 
opinions which were too radical. Ober elsewhere reminds us that “in Athenian juries, there was 
no judge,” and rather than “deferring to elite expertise...‘the citizenry believed itself to be the 
best judge of important matters’”(Ober 92). 
 Thus it is not a modification to social media that is needed to filter out fake news, but an 
increase in social media usage. As individuals become increasingly digitally literate, they can 
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provide their own ability to distinguish expertise from presumption. Not only is this method in 
line with the “free expression” ethos of the internet, but it also is more responsive to changes in 
fake news as it rapidly alters to avoid detection. Sometimes, top-down coordination by experts is 
simply too slow. 
 
iii. Conclusion
First, we found that social media--due to its expanded reach and the impulse it breeds towards 
searching for the “other” in a non-superficial way--is theoretically an ideal medium to replicate 
the Athenian Assembly under Pericles. Then turning to the practical, and borrowing Philip 
Kitcher’s method for ethical change, we found that social media replicates the foremost qualities 
Kitcher identifies as necessary for ethical deliberation to occur. Specifically, it has the ability to 
bring about ethical change by including more citizens’ interests and relevants facts in the 
deliberative process. Following Kitcher, it does this by ensuring that all deliberators are 
discussing a common object (KE) and that opinions are filtered through a Hall of Mirrors (KW), 
correcting for individual biases by reflecting each opinion through other’s opinions of it, and so 
on and so forth. The process is akin to the reception one’s speech receives in the Assembly. A 
lone jeer is not enough to silence a speaker but must find support within a chorus in order to 
force a speaker to sit down. Finally, we found that the oft-noted problem of “fake news” is 
indeed a problem, but that its solution lies not in the creation of a filtering mechanism, but in the 
increased digital literacy of the citizenry--brought about by increased internet usage. This 
accords not only with many expert’s opinions on the matter, but also the democratic workings of 
the Assembly itself. In conclusion, increased social media use--achieved by providing increased 
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leisure to the citizenry--is liable both theoretically and practically to bring about ethical change, 
paving the way towards greater ethical consensus and political action.
iv. Looking Forward
Of course, instituting these payments for social media usage would entail a significant 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.  In light of this fact, along with conservative 
American’s longstanding resistance to wealth redistribution--as exemplified by their deadly fear 
of socialism--it is necessary to now justify this mode of redistribution on liberal’s own terms. 
That is, insofar as conservatives believe they are guarding “liberty”--understood as free-market 
liberalism--from a creeping socialism, they must be convinced that any proposed transfers of 
wealth are to be done in the name of promoting that free-market liberalism that they associate 
with liberty. For example, one can not justify redistribution with an appeal to “community,” as I--
along with many others--have tried. Because of liberalism’s commitment to individual autonomy, 
such claims fail prima facie, reliant as they are upon a political value not expressly promoted by 
liberalism.
	 For the second half of this project, I will employ liberalism’s own credos to fend off the 
hypothetical liberal’s knee-jerk reaction of opposition to the wealth redistribution I have just 
proposed. To do so, I analyze two pieces of liberal dogma: first, Locke’s chapter On Property, in 
which he derives a right to property from labor, and second, a Lockean liberal justification of 
“workfare”--the form of welfare payments cemented by Bill Clinton in which recipients must 
perform specified labor-- as provided by liberal political scientist Oren Levin-Waldman. I argue 
that when taken in light of recent developments in capitalist production, the principles upheld in 
both arguments in fact point towards the type of non-market distribution which I have argued for 
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thus far. To remain faithful to Locke, therefore, is to simultaneously follow Pericles and institute 
payments for leisure and corresponding social media usage.
IV. Locke, Private Property, and the Efficiency Thesis
In this chapter, I show that Locke’s justification for a right to private property rests upon his 
understanding of that right as instrumental in achieving a common good. This contrasts with a 
popular understanding of private property as a moral right in itself, outside of any communal 
context or societal effects. While the former would allow for an abridgment of these rights 
insofar as it achieves the communal good which they initially aimed at, the latter would restrict 
government action to protecting preexisting property, regardless of the consequences of doing so. 
By establishing the instrumentality of property rights, I hope to show that Locke held private 
ownership of land in no particular high esteem--indeed he affirms that land is given by God to all 
in common--but that he nonetheless remained within a private property scheme of ownership 
because he believed it was necessary to do so for the community--in this case mankind--to reap 
the rewards that the earth has to offer. 
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i. Property Rights Paradigms
John Locke, along with Hobbes and J.S. Mill, is considered the “ideological forefather” of 
modern liberalism (Hirschmann 9). Of his most decisive contributions is the chapter “On 
Property” from his Second Treatise of Government, in which he derives necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a right to property. It is important to note that he does not question the existence of 
a right to property, but only its specific form, or, who it should be given to. Having spent his first 
Treatise denying Adam and his heirs’ dominion over the earth, he is not “content” with the 
natural conclusion that no man “should ever come to have a property”(Locke 18). Thus to 
replace these now-defunct monarchic property titles, Locke assumes a premise of property and 
works backwards to justify its proper foundation. 
 Among competing theories of Locke’s justification for property, I side with the efficiency 
thesis45, wherein property rights are understood as instrumental in achieving an efficient 
exploitation and division of resources. As one author puts it: “Individual property rights are 
promoted only insofar as those rights promote the use of labor in advancing society's 
welfare”(Henry 615)(emphasis mine). While as a matter of fact a right to property can only 
inhere in one person or organization, the benefits which are expected to flow from that right, and 
which justify the existence of that right, flow to society at large. 
 This is in contrast to the more absolutist version of property rights held by libertarian 
thinkers such as Nozick or Rothbard. For them, a right to property is a right held by the 
individual in isolation from her community; in fact, it is meant to protect her and her things from 
58
the encroachment of that community. Therefore, any “interference with property is an 
interference with a moral right, and therefore wrong in and of itself regardless of its 
consequences”(Barros 40-41)(emphasis mine). For them, Locke should be understood as placing 
property rights in the hands of the individual because to do so is morally right: the laboring 
individual deserves that which she produces. Property thus relies upon no other justification than 
the existence of individuals laboring to earn it; once secured by the individual, it is theirs to keep. 
 In an influential work, John Locke and the origins of private property, Matthew H. 
Kramer explicitly attacks the efficiency thesis. He also argues that Locke’s attempt to derive a 
right to property from one’s ownership of their own subjectivity, fails. However, both of 
Kramer’s views--rejection of the efficiency thesis and rejection of the cogency of property rights 
in themselves--are predicated upon a fundamental misconception of what Locke means by 
“labor.” I engage with Kramer’s work specifically because I believe this misconception regarding 
“labor” is widespread. Through a close reading and subsequent redefinition of “labor,” closer to 
what I believe Locke himself intended, I provide a novel method of reviving the efficiency 
thesis.  In doing so, I preserve the notion that Locke does not hold property to be a moral right, 
indivisible from the individual, but an instrumental requiring a communal context.
 I begin by outlining Kramer’s objection that Locke fails to establish property rights 
derived from the ownership of one’s subjectivity. Then I present another, more minor, charge of 
incoherence leveled by Kramer. After, I will provide my own--and what I believe to be Locke’s--
definition of “labor”. Support for this definition is to be found in its ability to resolve both 
problems posed by Kramer to Locke’s theory. Finally, having proved the appropriateness of this 
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definition, I will employ it to overcome Kramer’s denial of the efficiency thesis, responding to 
objections at the end. 
ii. Kramer’s Objection
According to Kramer, Locke “unwittingly confirmed...his argument [for property] was 
invalid”(Kramer, 150). Apparently,  Locke’s argument rests upon an equivocation of  “labor.” 
While “we indeed can tell...he was drawing an inference [from labor to property],” says Kramer, 
the argument is invalid unless he is drawing an identity. His reconstructs Locke’s main argument 
as follows :
1. In the state of nature, the labor of each person P belonged exclusively to P himself.
2. Each person P who improved some unowned assets by working on them had thereby mixed his labor 
with them.
3. In the state of nature, the labor of each person P belonged exclusively to P himself. (Kramer 150)
For Kramer, n premises 1 and 2, the referent is located “within the subject,” akin to “an activity 
or a capacity or a flow of energy”(Kramer149). In conclusion 3, however, the referent of “labor” 
moves from within the subject to “within the object”(Kramer 150). He concludes: “the argument 
could not be valid” for it allows the possibility that “true statements about one kind of labor 
[would be] false when advanced about the other kind”(Kramer 150). We must also assume that 
Locke was not claiming an identity, for otherwise “there would have been no need whatsoever 
for [him] to construct an argument”(Kramer 150). Thus, Locke’s syllogism a non sequitur, doing 
little by way of establishing a right to property. 
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iii. Consumption as Property
Kramer goes on to identify other flaws in Locke’s reasoning elsewhere in On Property. 
Discussing Locke’s description of an indian picking up--and thereby gaining property in--berries 
before appropriating their “nourish[ment]”, Kramer says Locke for “conflat[es] possession and 
ownership, or, enjoyment and exclusive dominion”(Kramer 115). Locke’s assumption that 
ownership is necessary for survival is undermined, Kramer claims, by recognition that within his 
state of nature, people “could readily survive without owning any goods, as long as they all had 
privileges to use and consume the goods”(Kramer 115). In the context of the definitions Kramer 
provides of Right and Privilege (from Hohfeld)46, this amounts to claiming that a right against 
others’ interference in one’s enjoyment of a good is superfluous to one’s enjoyment of that good. 
All that one really requires, in order to enjoy a good, is the lack of a duty to abstain from the 
enjoyment of that good. In other words, one need not be assured that they will be undisturbed in 
order to consume a berry; rather, one need only be assured that they themselves are not forbidden 
to consume that berry. Once this assurance is met, one is free to begin consumption, come what 
may. Thus, ownership is not strictly necessary for consumption and thus survival, only the mere 
privilege to consume is. 
 Logically speaking, Kramer is correct: for the freedom to X, the lack of proscription 
against doing X is sufficient. However, this is only to reject Locke’s premise, not his argument. 
Specifically, it seeks to bring into question the very necessity of property rights and their 
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46 Right--”being endowed with a right consist in being normatively protected against someone else’s interference or 
in being entitled to someone else’s assistance or remuneration, with regard to a certain action or a certain state of 
affairs.”
Privilege--”to have a privilege to engage in a certain action is to be free from a duty to eschew the action; likewise, 
to have a privilege to abstain from a certain action is to be free from a duty to undertake the action”(Kramer 16).
ontological status. However, for Locke, the question at hand is not if men come to have property, 
but “how men might come to have a property,”(Locke 18)(emphasis mine). Locke is supposing 
humans do have property at some point in order to then move backwards to find its rightful 
justification and starting point. 
 The purpose of the indian example is thus vastly different than what Kramer takes it to 
be. It is not to show that an individual must obtain a property right to consume food, for this 
would be absurd. As Locke himself notes, “If such a consent as that was necessary, man [would 
have] starved”; there is simply no time to await the rise of civilization and the granting of 
property rights when one needs nourishment(Locke 19). Instead, the example makes the 
unobjectionable observation that, if we are to grant property rights, as has already been the case 
for hundreds of years by the time Locke is writing, the best place to begin looking for them is the 
certain ownership one has over the things they have consumed. “He that is nourished,” Locke 
says, “has certainly appropriated...to himself”(Locke 19)(emphasis mine). 
 Kramer himself contends that such an ownership over consumed goods is absolutely 
useless. Nobody would attempt to obtain bile-drenched food out of one’s stomach and, if they 
did, the act would be illegal regardless. However for Locke, this is precisely the point. Once food 
has been consumed it becomes “a part of” its consumer, and “another can no longer have any 
right to it,” as Kramer himself affirms(Locke 19). If property is ownership, then it should be 
uncontroversial to claim that the indian thus owns the food he consumes. As Kramer notes, this a 
trivial point and basically unobjectionable. It amounts to no more than a restatement of Locke’s 
initial premise, an idea at the heart of Anglican jurisprudence: each man has a right to his own 
body. In Lockean terms, “the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on 
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earth”(Locke 17). The supreme triviality of this point for Anglo-American thinkers makes it the 
best place to begin our search for when this ownership--here in its final, most definite stage of 
post-consumption--begins. 
iv. From Consumption to Labor
If a consumed good is “certainly” the indian’s property, then “when did [it] begin to be his” 
property? (Locke 19) Because Locke wants to say that there is a time prior to a good’s 
consumption in which a property within that good is acquired, we must look back at the relevant 
actions leading to that good’s consumption, choosing amongst them to determine which action 
instantiated the doer’s property in the good. In pursuit of this action, Locke poses a series of 
possible answers: is it “when he digested?...when he eat [sic]?...when he boiled?...when he 
brought them home?...when he picked them up?”(Locke 19). He responds that it is “plain” that if 
it was not the initial “gathering” (of acorns), no other action could serve as the relevant 
instantiating act. By adding something “more than nature,” the gatherer gains a “private right” in 
the goods he gathered(Locke 19). The acquisition of property is thus simultaneous with the 
performance of the act that initiates the chain of actions which eventually allow for 
consumption--an action he terms “labour”(Locke 19).
 What becomes evident in this analysis is the reliance of  labor’s justificatory power to 
found property rights on the latter act of consumption. Such a reliance seems to leave property 
rights on rather shaky ground. If labor only justifies property insofar as it leads to consumption, 
the possibility is left open of laboring without acquiring corresponding property rights should 
one fail to consume what they produce, a puzzling result. Because a temporal gap often exists 
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between the time one labors and when one finally consumes what they have produced, the status 
of a stolen good appears in doubt. In other words, if it is only my consumption that can justify 
my invoking a right against another’s interference with the goods I have produced, how can I 
claim an invasion of my rights when an apple which I have yet to consume is stolen from my 
cupboard? 
v. From Subject to Object--Redefining “Labor”
The problem is identical in form to Kramer’s more central objection to Locke’s derivation of 
property rights. Both question how the fact of ownership over one’s own subjectivity can then 
justify ownership of over objects existing outside of oneself. In the first case, Kramer was 
explicit in showing that Locke failed to cross the void between individual subjectivity and 
objective ownership. In the second, Kramer failed to understood why a consumed good was 
necessarily the consumer’s property. However in denying these accounts of acquisition, while 
failing to provide their replacement, Kramer does not disprove the arguments, but rejects their 
premise that property as a right exists. 
 In order to answer this dilemma, while maintaining the existence of property right, we are 
left to conclude that labor, far from merely “an activity or a capacity” residing in the subject, is 
actually a concept describing that energy which is expended in the service of, and ultimately 
leading to, consumption.  To provide the link between the subject and the object they both 
produce and have the rightful title to consume, labor must be understood as a teleology 
encompassing them both. It is not any labor, but that “flow of energy” performed in the service 
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of consumption. Because property thus requires consumption for its existence, a right to property  
does not arise until a good is consumed.
 As for the apple from the cupboard, once consumption does occur and the teleology is 
complete, a claim can be made by the good’s producer that the good was not consumed by its 
rightful owner. If the claimant can prove that the good’s consumer did not produce the good, nor 
rightfully receive it from the original producer, or another whom had himself received it 
rightfully from the original producer, then its consumer can be charged with theft. Thus when our 
producer opens their cupboard with a mind to make apple pie, and sees their apple missing, they  
would file a claim as they ordinarily would for a stolen good. If the culprit is found, along with 
the apple, it is returned, he is charged with attempted robbery, and the producer enjoys their 
property right a la mode later than evening. If the culprit is found, apple already consumed, they 
are charged with robbery, and justice served. 
 However if the original producer only notices their is apple is missing during a daily 
surveillance of their antique apple collection, the thief can make a claim to the apple herself. If 
they can prove that the producer was unlikely to consume the good before it went rotten, and that 
they themselves or another to whom they had given it to was able to consume the good before it 
did so, no robbery occurred47. For example, if the producer had 300 apples which all were going 
to rot in the next ten days, and the claimant showed that the producer was unlikely to consume or 
aid in the consumption of thirty apples each day, the thief would have been justified in 
consuming apples on his own. 
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47 This also might be attempted robbery on behalf of the apple collector. 
 Identification of ownership thus rests not entirely upon the initial powers being expended 
but the actor’s intent in doing so. If the initial laborer has plans for consuming, or providing for 
the consumption of, the good that they produce, the ownership title is theirs. If, however, they 
have so many goods that they neglect most of them, our sense of justice is served by saying that 
the thief who stole a good without being noticed because the producer had so many goods piled 
up, did not really steal, but aided in consumption. If he is caught, he has the opportunity to return 
the good, or convince a jury that the producer had no plans for consumption. Our sense of justice 
is well-served because property titles are consumption-centric, meaning one loses title as one 
gathers good which one cannot possible consume. Imagine the producer as a sun, her goods in 
orbit; the more goods she accumulates, the farther away they are placed, and the weaker the tug 
of gravity becomes. The same goes for the owner who stockpiles goods: those within their 
immediate range of consumption are firmly theirs but, as we move outwards towards goods 
which are in excess of one’s consumption abilities, their claim weakens.
vi. Kramer and Efficiency 
I overturn Kramer’s definition of labor in pursuit of a larger goal: to refute his denial of the 
efficiency thesis48. Once again, this thesis holds that Locke justified his scheme of individual 
property rights on the grounds that it provided a good for society as a whole: specifically, an 
efficient production and distribution of goods expropriated from a limited amount of resources. 
This is contrast to those who hold property rights to be absolute, reliant upon no other end for 
them to achieve, and thus inalienable by any legislative action. I aim to prove the former because 
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48 “Understood in the current language of economics, these passages [those which supporters of the “efficiency 
thesis” garner for their support] commend private property as the most efficient vehicle for apportioning 
wealth”(Kramer 118).
I believe Locke--in line with his Christianity-- held that land was by nature communal, and thus 
only accorded private title to it insofar as that would allow efficient production. The only 
consideration that could overrule his god-given communism was the necessity of making the 
land bear fruit in order to multiply the human race. 
 For Kramer, the efficiency thesis is incorrect because it is incoherent to base an 
individual right (to property) upon a communal good (of efficient production and distribution) 
unless a causal relation between the two can be firmly established. He disputes on two separate 
grounds the efficiency theorist’s claim that this causal mechanism does in fact exist. First, he 
rejects the notion that ownership enables increased and efficient production. Then, even granting 
an increase in production, he attacks the idea that this increase in production is a communal 
good: without an explicit mechanism assuring that the increase in production is distributed 
amongst all, benefits may only accrue to a select group49. Thus, the efficiency theorist can not 
claim that the individual right to property is instrumental is achieving communal good because, 
as Kramer says, “we should not infer that every person fared better in the scheme of proprietary 
rights” (Kramer 125). I will briefly deal with the first contention, then attack the latter using my 
teleological definition of Lockean “labor.” 
 
a. Increased Production
Seeking the philosophical basis for Locke’s implicit claim that “the most efficient uses of 
nature’s bounty” depends upon “private ownership,” Kramer suggests what he has in mind is 
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49 “Even though have avouched for the sake of argument that the scheme of mere privileges would have generated a 
somewhat smaller measure of output on the whole, we should not infer that every person fared better in the 
scheme of proprietary rights”(Kramer 125)(emphasis mine).
something like Aristotle in the Politics (Kramer 119)50. Kramer responds that this picture 
“presumes people were so voracious...they would refuse to work...unless they reaped all the 
material profits,” a premise not even Hobbes would endorse(Kramer,120). This refutation, 
however, stems from a failure to distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding 
interests51. It is a trivial truth that individuals act so as to benefit themselves. By allowing them 
to benefit from their work, therefore, they are liable to work more. This benefit, however, is not 
dependent upon one’s “voraciousness,” in the sense that one seeks to consume all that they 
produce. Rather it includes such diverse interests as “help[ing] one’s friends, guests, or 
companions,” which, Aristotle notes, “one can [do] if one has property”(Aristotle 83). The 
distinction is not between hedonistic consumption and communitarian sharing, but more like the 
difference between taxation by a government in which one has a say on how that money is spent, 
and one in which an individual’s interests are ignored52. The incentive provided by ownership, 
therefore, does not rely upon a perspective focused solely upon oneself, but rather one which 
allows the placing of greater weight upon certain individuals’ interests due to one’s relationship 
with them--a common human incentive.
b. Restrictions on Ownership
Even granting that property rights increase output, Kramer still sees a “yawning gap” between 
the resulting “individual well-being,” and the supposed “collective well-being” which served as 
its basis (Kramer 124). For him, forge their identity would require some bold assumptions about 
68
50 “when care for property is divided up, it leads to...greater care being given”...”Evidently, then, it is better for 
property to be private”(Aristotle 83)
51 “Self-regarding actions are actions which effect only the agent and have no effect on others”(Ten 29)
52 No taxation without representation. 
the make-up of society 53. However, Kramer missteps in assuming that the achievement of 
communal good is dependent upon each and every individual’s increasing their labor and 
property. By neglecting the teleological aspect of “labor,” Kramer fails to identify the 
redistributive mechanism implicit within Locke’s theory. 
 If what justifies property is its consumption, it follows that one loses a claim to property 
that goes unconsumed54. If more property is amassed than is “to any advantage of life,” the 
surplus must be either redistributed or “looked on as waste,” liable to become “the possession of 
any other”(Locke 24). Though not all peoples are explicitly provided for--as this would require 
the coercion of labor--Locke’s “waste” requirement ensures any output above that which satisfies 
human needs for livelihood will be given to other members of the community. This is as close to 
communism as Locke will tread. 
 Perhaps what disturbs Kramer is Locke’s subsequent introduction of “gold and silver” 
into his state of nature, and the “disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth” which 
follows(Locke 29). As C.B. Macpherson notes, the introduction of money seems to “render 
inoperative the spoilage limitation”(Locke xvii). However, does it really follow from the use of 
currency that food no longer spoils? One is still responsible for distributing surplus goods; the 
difference is now the producer may “receive in exchange for the overplus gold and silver”(Locke 
29). Because they are extraneous to the “support and comfort” of mankind, hoarding these metals 
is not injurious to others (Locke 18). Thus the spoilage limitation is indeed overcome, but not in 
Macpherson’s sense. The introduction of currency does not “establish a natural right to unlimited 
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53 “One will have to maintain that every person within the state of nature had just the talents and likings that would 
cause him to get more wealth in a scheme of private property than in any scheme of privileges...however, such a 
contention will be ludicrously far-fetched”(Kramer 125).
54 “If the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified...he had no right” and was “liable to be punished”(Locke 24). 
amounts of private property” without regard for others(Locke xvii). Rather, it enables an 
individual, should he find “gold and silver” to be of value, to reap benefits from his labor in the 
form of these precious metals long after he has satisfied any need for consumption. 
c. Mechanism of Distribution
The question remains how these excess goods are to make it into the hands of those who need 
them. Given the latter’s need of these goods to sustain their body, the producer seems to hold 
unlimited power in negotiations for these goods. However, this leverage is diminished by the 
producer’s need to distribute his goods before they spoil, or face punishment. The case is 
analogous to a clearance sale. Still, the great power possessed by those with excess holdings is 
not to be overlooked.
 This understanding of property enables us to make sense of Locke’s claim that “the desire 
of having in our possession...more than we have need of,” is “the desire ‘for the submission of 
other’s to one’s will’” and the “root of all evil”(Tarcov 142)(Levin-Waldman 44). In attempting 
to defend his own absolutist conception of property as being “joined to liberty,” Oren Levin-
Waldman admits that many readers will be surprised to find that Locke holds such an opinion 
regarding its accumulation(Levin-Waldman 44). To escape the confusion, Levin-Waldman 
submits that what Locke was discouraging was not the desire for accumulation of property as 
such, but rather the “desire for property as power over others”(Levin-Waldman 44). Clearly his 
claim fails as it seeks to open up a space between the two terms which Locke expressly disavows 
by equating them. 
70
 If labor is the necessary precursor to the existence of comestibles, as well the creator of 
property rights over those comestibles, we can see why the accumulation of property would 
entail dominion over others. In accumulating that which is necessary for another’s survival, the 
other, if unable to produce for himself, is at the mercy of the laborer. The only way to overcome 
this dominion, absent the presence of time-limits on sales for consumption, is to instill in citizens 
a willingness to give away that which they have produced. Coincidentally, this is the mindset 
Locke seeks to nurture through his educational system55, and one which he identifies as vital to 
the functioning of a liberal society. 
vii. Objections
By failing to recognize the teleologic nature of Locke’s conception of “labor,” Kramer is unable 
to identify the link between the laboring individual and her right to the nourishment consumed 
thereafter. In fact, they two are parts of the same action, relating to one another as cause and 
effect. This teleologic conception of labor allows us to identify the mechanism whereby 
individual benefits from property rights redound to society as a whole. If property rights only 
follow from work performed for the purposes of consumption, and each individual is bounded in 
the amount of consumption they need and can enjoy before spoilage, all excess production is 
distributed amongst those with less. Although prosperous laborers may seek gold or silver in 
return, Locke urges the act of giving as the proper mode of liberal civility. The link between 
individual and communal well-being is thus made operational-the efficiency thesis is alive and 
well. 
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55 ”And by this Means, by a constant Practice, Children having made it easie to themselves to part with what they 
have...they may take Pleasure...in being Kind, liberal and Civil to others”(Tarcov 142)(emphasis mine).
 I anticipate an objection to my reading of Locke due to its reliance on “consumption” to 
identify property rights. In an oft-cited passage Locke remarks that “a king of a large and fruitful 
[Native American] territory...feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in 
England”(Locke 26). This is understood as an indictment of the subsistence farming system for 
its inability to cultivate wealth. As per Alan Ryan’s interpretation, the claim is “that even the 
worst off in modern society is better off than he would be outside it”(Locke and Sigmund 303). 
Having been “furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty,” the Native 
Americans lack a desire to “improv[e]...by labour” and thus, while being “rich in land,” are 
“poor in all the comforts of life”(Locke 25). Though it is only the “penury of his condition” 
which forces man to labor, the benefits from labor do not cease following the achievement of 
those bare necessities which enable the prolongation of life56(Locke 21). 
 Construing my usage of “consumption” quite literally, it may be argued that I have 
overlooked this passage. In claiming that the only work which engenders property is that which 
provides sustenance, I seem to be advocating for a community whose sole aim is the continuation 
of life, and not its improvement--contrary to Locke’s expressed preference. However, my 
definition does not rule out the possibility of property in amenities. In fact, it is closer to the 
definition of consumption provided by economists--”the use of goods and services by 
households”.57 This further definition, however, appears to strip “consumption” of its ability to 
distinguish between work that is property-enabling and that which is not. Lacking a clear 
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56 The world is given to men not only “to make use of it to the best advantage of life” but also for “convenience,” as 
well as the “comfort of their being”(Locke,18).
57 "Consumption." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
delineation, no upward bound to an individual’s accumulation exists, and thus the redistribution 
mechanism falls away. Can we ascertain a middle ground between these two definitions? 
 Indeed we can. The goods whose usage is titled “consumption” need not be a static 
category. It should progress along with society. As the economy matures, and more wealth 
created, the number of goods which are “consumed” should increase, reflecting the fact of 
greater abundance58. That which falls outside the scope we may entitle “luxury,” a category used 
to render a judgment about a good: its primary worth is not in its utility. To use an example from 
Locke’s era, large estates overseen by feudal lords are not wasteful by their very nature. They are 
a waste, however, when other individuals within the same society may be saved from starvation 
by gaining some ownership in of that land. The property of being a “consumped” or “luxury” 
good is thus relational.
 In modern times, we recognize a “poverty line.” This is a socially determined level of 
income below which we have deemed it difficult for individuals to continue a dignified 
existence. Though this level is too low, given comforts enjoyed by others within society, its form 
provides a blueprint for distinguishing between work performed in the service of consumption 
and that which is not. Until all individuals within society obtain the bundle of goods (or level of 
income) determined to be necessary for a worthwhile living, the accumulation of goods or 
income outside of that scope should fall under deep suspicion. This reflects the intuitive idea that 
all should be provided with shelter before an individual may expect a right to a castle.
 It also allows us to extend the notion of “consumption” to durable goods. Let’s take an 
example of a computer. Outside of extraordinary cases, we can probably assume that an 
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58 Televisions, for example, were once a rarity. 
individual need not possess more than two computers at a time. This is not morally wrong, it is 
just highly unlikely that one individual would “consume” more than two computers at a time in 
the same way that an average person would “consume” a computer. He may, for example, use 
thirty computers at once, using each to open a single search tab, but this would not be entitled 
“consumption” of the good as it is a highly idiosyncratic usage. The same goes for a home: a 
family of four is unlikely to “consume” thirty bedrooms in the way bedrooms are typically meant 
to be “consumed.” All that we need to make such judgments is an understanding of how goods 
are typically “consumed.” Of course, if the mansion’s owner would like to keep property title to 
his bedrooms, he need only allow others to “consume” his excess rooms for sleep: because they 
are in fact consumed, and he initially produced them, no question of property title arises, and he 
remains in his abode. 
 Another objection may be leveled at the feasibility of the mechanism of distribution I 
indicate as latent in Locke’s theory. If an individual may stockpile gold, and then use that gold to 
purchase the surplus property of others, what is to stop him from sitting on that property rather 
putting it to productive purpose? This mistaken concern is analogous to Macpherson’s claiming 
that Locke “established a natural right to unlimited amount of private property”(Locke xvii). To 
the contrary, the introduction of coin does not uproot another’s right to appropriate one’s waste. 
Rather it is a method whereby those industrious men who “had agreed that a little piece of 
yellow metal...should be worth a great piece of flesh,” may feel that they have received 
something in return for distributing away their surplus(Locke 23). It is a tool to lubricate 
exchange by overcoming trepidation towards giving things away. Locke does not permit the 
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unlimited accumulation of truly necessary items, only these tokens of value59. Though Locke 
recognizes how foolish this is given that “things really useful...are generally things of short 
duration,” he feels no need to correct for this irrationality given the distribution of really useful 
goods it allows(Locke 28). While things people really need--housing, clothing, food--do wear 
down, albeit some sooner than others, gold and silver remain through time with a polish here and 
there. 
viii. Conclusion
Basing property upon a teleological conception of “labor,” Locke achieves two goals. First, by 
requiring physical, value-adding labor, he denies monarchical property rights according to title. 
Then, by limiting title to labor for consumption, he places limits on the laborer’s holdings. While 
not expressly providing for the community, his threat of punishment for wastage--should a 
surplus be produced--ensures that surplus will be spread rather than allowed to waste. Finally, 
confronting the rise of capitalism--and the use of gold and silver--Locke allows capital’s 
unlimited acquisition, so log as it does not hinder the distribution of really useful goods.
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59 “..if he would exchange his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his keep for shells, or 
wool for a sparkling pebble or diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he 
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; exceeding of the bounds of his just property not 
lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it”(Locke 28). The proper objects 
for accumulation are not the nuts or wool, but the diamonds and shells. 
V. Workfare and Reciprocity 
In the previous chapter, I upheld an efficiency thesis reading of Locke’s private property rights 
against objections made to it by Kramer. I concluded that Locke meant to grant property rights to 
individuals in an effort to achieve a communal good--efficient production and distribution of 
goods--rather than as the prescription of an absolutist moral maximum. In doing so, I opened up 
space for governmental transfers of wealth which would have been foreclosed had property 
rights been understood as inalienable. By connecting property rights to an end they are meant to 
achieve, property rights are able to viewed--and altered--in light of their ability to achieve the 
end for which they were put in place. 
 In modern America, wealth transfers do in fact occur. Where they are not connected to a 
specific program, but meant to elevate the well-being of a disadvantaged individual, however, 
they take the form of workfare. Begun by Reagan and signed into law by Clinton in 1992, 
workfare requires participants to perform labor in return for the payments they receive. Because 
what I am proposing--payments for social media usage-- is in effect a welfare program, in this 
section I will explore this liberal workfare state, exposing its ultimate implicit reliance upon a 
notion of reciprocity. Reciprocity is understood as the principle that a state can only provide 
payments to its citizens insofar as the state is assured to thereby gain an equal benefit in return. 
In other words, the state is constrained in its giving of payments to instances of assured “mutual 
advantage,” thereby making illegal any state attempt to provide payments to citizens merely out 
of mercy, fairness, or concerns of welfare.
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 I argue that reciprocity was originally invoked so as to privilege the economic over the 
political sphere in the distribution of property.  This in turn was done to justify declaring 
monarchical property titles illegitimate for this was the predominant form of property title in 
England at the time, and one which the Founders sought to escape. Now, however, the economic 
sphere’s ability to guarantee reciprocity has become sufficiently problematized as to warrant its 
closer scrutiny--the subject of my next and final chapter. 
 First, I present ongoing debates regarding the proper form the welfare state should take . 
Then, I present the liberal defense of American workfare state. Next, I show why this defense 
implicitly relies upon reciprocity. Finally, I discuss other relevant examples in which reciprocity 
was invoked, as well as briefly problematize its current status within the free market.
i. Decommodification versus Activation
Debates surrounding the “Welfare State,” Richard Titmuss explains, revolve around its 
“principles and objectives”(Pierson and Castles 40). Using his distinction, we can identify two 
grounds of welfare policy disagreement-- its objectives and its principles. Or, what is its end and, 
what is the principle--as expressed in the particular means employed to reach that end--which 
grounds citizens’ notion of the welfare state? Responses can be plotted along two axes: de-
commodification versus activation and welfare versus workfare. The former deals with the ends 
of a proposed welfare system, and the latter its means towards getting there. I will present both 
debates, discussing the ideology behind each. 
 Decommodification refers to policies which free citizens from the “market compulsion to 
work” through the provision of “a socially acceptable standard of living,” independent of their 
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market participation(Huo et al. 7)(Tabin et al. 133). To its supporters, decommodification is the 
political response “implied” by “modern social rights” in the face of a “hegemonic” capitalism 
which has left individuals “depend[ent] entirely” upon their ability to sell their labor60 (Pierson 
and Castles 163). Describing the freedom not to labor for another as a right, supporters describe 
decommodification as a response to a change of facts, and not a change of opinion regarding 
rights61. Its potential beneficiaries are the “students, single mothers and artists..no longer be[ing] 
required to take jobs that would prevent them from pursuing the very lifestyles they were seeking 
to support,” as well as impoverished individuals freed from “tak[ing] the most menial, alienating 
and exploitative of jobs simply to survive”(Panitch 937). Severing the link between survival and 
employment, decommodification ensures the latter is not undertaken purely for the sake of the 
former. This in turn strengthens the bargaining position of the worker, allowing her greater 
control in her economic and material fate.62 To one supporter, it means “the ‘real freedom’ to 
choose how to spend [one’s] time”(Panitch 935). 
 While decommodification holds sway in many Nordic states, it does not in more liberal 
regimes, such as the U.S.63 Due to a commitment to achieving “high public employment,”64 
increasing labor market participation “takes [political] precedence over labor market exit.”65 
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60 “Capitalism is defined [by Marx] as a set of social relations produced by a mode of production characterized by 
the commodification of the product of labor”(Tabin et al. 129). 
61 “In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was contingent 
upon the sale of their labour power”(Pierson and Castles 163). 
62 “De-commodification strengthens the workers and weakens the absolute authority of the employer”(Pierson and 
Castles 163). 
63 “...Esping-Anderson identifies the Nordic welfare states as the most decommodifying type of welfare states,” 
while, “by contrast, the liberal welfare state regimes are the least decommodifying”(Huo et al. 7). 
64 Consider, for example, the Department of Labor’s monthly release of the “Employment Situation Summary,” or, 
so-called “jobs report.”
65 “...the emphasis [for liberal welfare policies] is on involuntary and temporary separation from the labour 
market...and on maximum support for reintegration”(Huo et al. 8). 
Thus, the goal of reinstating a “right”--as per decommodification--is replaced by the search for 
“‘a productivist reordering of social policy,’” with the aim of putting individuals back to 
work(Pierson and Castles 458). The objective of liberal policies is activation. Instead of 
immediate economic freedom, welfare payments go towards long-term “social 
investment...facilitating labour market entry and...increasing productivity”(Huo et al. 8)66. 
 The motives behind these policies reflect normative stances towards different forms of 
“dependence”. For activation-minded policymakers, a dependence upon employment for 
survival is less harmful to an individual’s autonomy than a dependence upon the state67. By 
investing in “skills,” they argue, an individual “ensure[s] returns” on their investment in the 
future. Unlike decommodification programs, which rely on political consensus, activation 
policies only require upon an individual motivated to improve their skills, along with a 
functioning labor market. Thus, “among economists” and others who place great faith in the free 
market, activation policies “will always appear in a more positive light”(Jensen 60). 
 For decommodifiers, the obnoxious form of dependence is that of the worker upon his 
employer. Making clear a commitment to Marx, they describe their policy as a “‘revolt against 
proletarian subjection to the wage relationship, and hence to the capitalists‘ rule’”(Panitch 937). 
If the state provides income, they reason, citizens will not necessarily need to ask capitalists to 
do so as well. This cushions them against the “basic social risk[s]” endemic to markets, such as 
unemployment(Panitch 939). 
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66 “Contending that social policies do not play the sole role of allowing workers to ‘opt out’ of the labour market, 
Iverson (2005) shows that social policies can play a market-correcting role by inducing investment in specific skills. 
To the extent that workers and employers invest in skills and wish to ensure returns on these investments in the 
future, social policies protect the position of the works in the labour market”(Huo et al. 8). 
67 “And though the employment relationship causes individuals to rely on their labour and therefore commodifies 
them, market dependency may actually be less threatening to an individual’s autonomy than family or state 
dependency”(Huo et al. 8). 
 Differences in opinion regarding the desirability of market- as opposed to state- 
“dependence” stem from different understandings of the necessity of actions within these 
institutions. For activationists, political action relies upon consensus, while market action is 
undertaken by isolated entities who are viewed as passive responders to market forces68.Thus an 
individual ingratiated with market forces, possessing valuable skills, necessitates an offer of 
employment. Therefore the development of marketable skills is the best way to achieve 
independence insofar as it is defined as a guaranteed stream of income. While government action 
is determined by legislation which is out of one’s control, market actors perform necessary, 
predictable responses to the objective market forces brought about by oneself. 
 To a decommodifier, it is instead capitalists who wield a transient, changing power, while 
democratic governments instantiate assurances to protect rights69. Thus, they describe their 
policy as a preserver of “rights,” as opposed to a provision of privileges. The right to survival 
free from compulsion, they claim, is fundamental to the legitimacy of democratic governance. 
Therefore the expansion of capitalist practice, and the compulsion to labor as an employee it 
imposes, “implies” the necessity of establishing of decommodifying policies. It is the political 
body--forced to protect rights in order to retain legitimacy--and not the capitalist entrepreneur, 
whose actions are necessitated in response to objective facts, thereby making them conducive to 
the promotion of individual independence.
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68 The idea of a purely reactionary, mechanistic market actor is best captured by an analogy made by F.A. Hayek: 
“the price system...enables entrepreneurs, by watching the movement of a comparatively few prices, as an engineer 
watches the hands of a few dials, to adjust their activities to those of their fellows”(Hayek 95)(emphasis mine). The 
entrepreneur passively receives information and responds accordingly, as if each situation entailed only one possible 
appropriate action--they are constrained. 
69 i.e. Due process, habeus corpus, bearing arms. 
 Both sides agree on the desirability of eradicating “dependence,” defining this as 
economic reliance upon another. They differ in their view as to which relationship--between the 
state and its citizens or between the capitalists and her workers--involves the more troubling 
form of dependency. For activationists, the unemployed individual has the “status of a dependent 
child,” emphasizing the reliance of the decommodified citizen upon the goodwill of a paternal 
government in the form of welfare payments (Minsky 22). Through gaining valuable skills, they 
argue, capitalists--in response to her newfound objective value--are constrained to award her 
employment and income, thus securing their freedom. Decommodifiers, on the other hand, view 
government as constrained to preserve rights, identifying one’s autonomy over survival as an 
example of a right. Furthermore, capitalists, because of their privileged position--after all it is not  
their survival on the line--will always be less dependent than the worker, likely to exploit the 
dependence of the latter. Thus, it is within the sphere of the political, and not the economic, that 
individuals are able to obtain meaningful freedom from dependence. 
ii. Welfare versus Workfare
Another axis of dispute concerns the principle behind welfare as understood by the relation of 
the individual to their economy. Specifically, it concerns notion of fault. When someone is 
unemployed, fault for this inability to secure employment may be attributed either to a “market” 
or to the individual. The choice of attribution determines whether payments should be 
guaranteed--as in the case of disability, the individual not needing to perform any labor in 
return--or stipulated--as in the case of typical contracts, with individuals performing specified 
labor in to obtain benefit. Fault, while not itself necessitating the usage of stipulations, is 
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necessary to ground any stipulation on payments because, as Judith Sklar explains, otherwise 
stipulations would be “‘coercive in that one who is forced to work due to a condition beyond 
one’s control is effectively being punished’”(Waldman 122). If instead welfare is compensation 
for the ills of the “market,” and not an act of volition, the possibility of stipulation is foreclosed. 
If, however, it is a policy to correct the mistakes of the individual, the state has every right to ask 
for something in return.
 Conservative author Lawrence Mead sums up the debate when he states: “Liberals 
[supporters of stipulation-free welfare] need to show why poor people are blameless, [and] 
therefore still deserving [of benefits without labor]; conservatives [supporters of payments with 
stipulations] need to show how the poor are competent and why they need to be held 
accountable[in the form of being made to labor]”(Pierson and Castles 116). Mead himself sees 
poverty as a “motivation problem” and champions Ronald Reagan’s “changing welfare into 
workfare70”(Pierson and Castles 116). His idea of the principle behind welfare--not remedy for 
“market” ills, but safety-net for personal failings--determined his justifying imposing 
stipulations71.  
 Combined, a state’s response to each of these two axes determine what form its welfare 
system will take. The chart below provides a simple visualization of the four options: 
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70 Workfare: a welfare system that requires those receiving benefits to perform some work or to participate in job 
training.
71 Thus, Titmuss ask: “can we and should we, in providing benefits and compensation, distinguish between ‘faults’ 
in the individual and the ‘faults’ of society,” adding that a response is needed before we can “identify and discuss the 
next steps in progress towards a ‘Welfare Society’”(Pierson and Castles 45-47).  
Objective/Method Welfare Workfare
Activation
(employment)
Decommodification
(decreased reliance 
on  market wage)
Offer of skill investment, 
payments guaranteed
Conditioned on performance 
of skill-increasing tasks
Unconditional, guaranteed 
payments--”Universal Basic 
Income”
Conditions which are not 
investments in workers’ 
skills
iii. American Welfare: The Liberal Defense
Having outlined the questions to be answered by any welfare system, I will now turn to the 
responses they have received in America. To do so, I will examine the liberal defense of the 
modern American welfare state as offered by one of its apologists--Oren Levin-Waldman. While 
he provides separate arguments for upholding both an activation-minded and workfare-
stipulating policy, I will show that they both ultimately rely upon a notion of “reciprocity”. 
Specifically,  the presumption that reciprocity is best met through the market system, and not 
politics. 
 In clear contrast to the “social rights” invoked by decommodifiers, Levin-Waldman, 
citing a Supreme Court decision, affirms that American welfare policy is predicated upon the 
voluntary “altruism of the community” and not its recognition of rights (Waldman 112). He 
affirms that citizens are only mandated to provide payments while “the social benefits...surpass 
the immediate costs”(Waldman 63). To ensure this happens, he concludes, workfare is employed. 
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If society is not constrained to transfer its goods, it must be induced to through the promise of 
“social benefit.”72 
 Once again, conditioned welfare implies individual fault. Though the Court does not 
address the question directly, its decision provides prima facie evidence for the prevalence of the 
individual-fault theory. Waldman also notes that opinion polls show that a majority of Americans 
view a “work ethic,” defined as holding a job, as “key” to citizenship(Waldman 122). If 
unemployment de-legitimizes one’s citizenship, it must be understood as a result of choice; any 
other cause would be unreasonable to motivate such a punishment. Thus, it is clear a majority of 
Americans view the individual as at fault in the case of their own unemployment, and therefore 
feel justified in requesting labor to be performed in return for their payment of income. 
 Waldman uses welfare’s status as a privilege to uphold its stipulated labor requirements. 
If the individual had no reasonable expectation that welfare payments would be provided--as he 
would if they were a right of his--it is not “punishment” when stipulations are attached. Then, 
further reifying the idea that unemployment is a choice, and thus the unemployed individual’s 
fault, Waldman compares these stipulations to environmental regulations on business. They are 
both, he says, the “attach[ment] [of] conditions to one’s pursuit of private interest in a market 
economy”(Waldman 124). Thus, he equalizes the position of the businessman looking to turn a 
profit and the unemployed individual seeking welfare payments: they are both undertaking 
voluntary “pursuit[s]”. In conclusion, Waldman holds that because unemployment is an 
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72 One author describes these programs thusly: “The workers can be outsourced to private charity groups to do any 
number of jobs that are currently not done. They might clean rivers, help the disabled, care for the elderly, clean up 
graffiti, plant public gardens... the list of potential useful things these people might do is boundless”(Montier and 
Pilkington17).  
individual fault, a society which then voluntarily shares with that individual may expect the 
performance of tasks in return. 
 Turning the focus from welfare’s contributors--society--to its recipients, Waldman also 
upholds a commitment to activation. He defines “the meaning of independence” within a modern 
state as “to have a job”(Waldman 60). This explicitly rejects the decommifiers’ claim that wage 
labor is dependence. Instead, to achieve independence,73 the state must pursue policies enabling 
citizens to gain employment. 
  Conveniently, both liberal commitments--activation and workfare--point to the same 
policy. Under workfare, not only is “something useful...presumably produced,” benefitting 
society, but production itself helps activate the unemployed; the practice of laboring “instill[s] 
within recipients the values, as well as the skills, necessary to confidently enter and remain in the 
active workforce”(Waldman 122). Waldman concludes, along with numerous others74,  that 
workfare is the necessary welfare policy for the liberal state, as it achieves both activation and, 
through stipulation, benefits to society.
 Waldman’s argument, however underdetermines its conclusion. His claim justifying 
activation--that independence is “having a job”--is premised upon a claim he makes earlier. 
When he denied the status of right to welfare payments, he implicitly affirmed that welfare 
legislation is politically voluntary, thus ensuring its recipients remain dependent upon society’s 
goodwill, and therefore making the economy the site of dependence. His argument for denying 
this status, however, is missing, besides a brief comment that labeling something as a right  
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73 Elsewhere, Levin-Waldman affirms autonomy as the terminal value of a liberal state.
74 Discussing the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,“ The Economist 
remarks that “ten years on, America's work-based welfare reforms have succeeded.” "From Welfare to Workfare." 
The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 29 July 2006. Web. 02 May 2017.
“shields us from responsibility”(Waldman 122). It is never made clear what this responsibility is 
for or to. Further, he fails to explain why the “social benefit” expected in return for payments can 
not be found in the payment itself a la the release of tension resulting from inequality, but must 
include the stipulation of labor. That is, while he has provided justifications for conditions on 
payments, namely their political voluntariness, he has not foreclosed the possibility of legislating 
unconditioned--yet activation-oriented--policies, leaving open the question of why the state can 
not “simply give people money and allow them to do as they please,” while offering the 
possibility of skill-increasing programs(Waldman 114). Thus, Waldman leaves us guessing at a 
crucial juncture. 
 However, by examining  other liberal critiques of non-workfare policies75, as well 
American judicial thought and practice, we can discern the an oft-cited principle which could 
ground Waldman’s--vis a vis the Supreme Court’s--claim that individuals can not receive 
payments from the state without corresponding stipulations on labor to be performed: reciprocity. 
 
iv. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is at the heart of numerous liberal arguments. Responding to philosopher Philippe 
Van Parijs’ call for “unconditional basic income (UBI), Elizabeth Anderson writes: “in granting a 
basic income that is not conditioned on the willingness of the able to work” the UBI both 
“offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that undergirds the welfare state”.76 If the 
state gives, it expects to take, too.
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75 Presumably the arguments they provide against non-workfare policies would simultaneously support its opposite--
workfare policies. 
76 Anderson, Elizabeth. "Optional Freedoms." Boston Review. Boston Review, 17 July 2014. Web. 02 May 2017.
 In the John Adams-authored Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, or the “model for the 
Federal Constitution,”  Article VI states: “No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have 
any other title77 to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those 
of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public”.78 
This establishes a one-to-one ratio between state-sponsored giving and taking which is later 
upheld in its reverse form in the Constitution.  Amendment V to the Bill of Rights states: “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” What the state takes, it 
must give, too. Thus, deeming welfare a privilege not only provided justification for the 
possibility of conditioned payments, but blocked the very possibility of legislating unconditioned 
payments.
 One is free to ask, however, why this notion of reciprocity seems baked into American 
liberalism, and why it necessitates “services” in return. Examining one of its founding 
documents--John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government--we can situate its importance 
historically. Specifically, it was meant to foreclose the possibility of a title to ownership 
stemming from one’s status by instead requiring it be founded upon labor. Locke begins: “It 
having been shown [in  the First Treatise]...That Adam had not, either by natural right of 
fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such authority...or dominion over the world,” 
it should be “impossible that...rulers now on earth should make any benefit” from a claim to 
being his heir (Locke 7).  The background to the Treatise is the rejection of the idea that a title to 
ownership deriving from a claim of political status--here being an “heir” to Adam--is legitimate. 
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77 “A comprehensive term referring to the legal basis for property ownership.” "Title." The Free Dictionary. Farlex, 
n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
78 Benjamin, S.B. "EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ARTICLE: THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780." LexisNexis® Litigation Essentials - Error. Temple 
University Law Review, Sept. 1997. Web. 02 May 2017.
Instead, a claim to ownership must stem from a concrete contribution made by the potential 
owner. Thus, Locke claims it is the addition of “labour that was mine” which allows me to 
“appropriate [goods] to” myself (Locke 20). Similarly, he states of the now-owner that he had 
“annexed to [his recently obtained property] something that was his property 79,” thereby giving 
him “title”(Locke 21). To gain property, then, one must give their property as well, annexing the 
two together. Once again, a one-to-one ratio between give and take is established. 
 Thus Locke, in breaking free from monarchy, had to privilege the economic sphere--of 
labor and value--over the political sphere--of status and consensus--in the distribution of goods. 
He did so by establishing the notion of reciprocity in regards to ownership title. To gain property, 
one must give some of one’s own property, labor-power, first--something no king would stoop to.
v. But Wait, There’s More
With the passage of time, Locke’s formula for reciprocity has become complicated. Not only 
have political status claims become more nuanced than a monarch’s claiming to be a descendent 
of Adam, but economic claims to reciprocity have become harder to detect. While for Locke, 
picking up acorns was sufficient to earn a title in them, very few such obvious appropriations 
occur in the modern economy. Most people are paid by wage for work that is increasingly 
distanced from the actual production of goods. Thus, to say they put out, in their labor-power, 
what they receive back in income, is a difficult claim to make. 
 However, that does not mean economists haven’t tried. One example is the 
“uncontroversial concept”--for orthodox economists, at least--of the marginal productivity of 
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79 i.e. his labor
labor (Felipe and McCombie 2). This states that labor is paid “only what he adds to the firm’s 
well-being or utility”.80 As Nozick puts it, distributive justice within a liberal capitalist society is 
“To each according to how much he benefits others who have the resources for benefiting those 
who benefit them”(Nozick 158). Notice the reciprocity of the exchange: benefit for benefit. 
 However, evidence abounds that, due its circular nature, there is a “virtual impossibility 
of testing the marginal productivity theory” (Felipe and McCombie 12). While consensus has not 
been reached on this point, it is salient that the market’s capacity for guaranteeing reciprocity has 
been problematized. For example, how much value does one’s marketing of a product add to that 
product? While it may increase sales for one firm, there is no evidence that one has added value 
to the set of preexisting property. It is thus [ questionable] unclear if reciprocity is met better by 
market forces--as Locke contends--than political ones. I will further discuss this possibility in th 
next chapter.
vi. Conclusion
First, I discussed points of disagreement regarding ends and means, respectively, in debates on 
the future of the “Welfare State”: decommodification versus activation and welfare versus 
workfare. Then, I showed that these commitments themselves relied upon differences in ideas 
concerning dependence and fault. Next, I provided a simple visualization for a state’s four 
possible positions regarding welfare payments. After that, I discussed the American welfare state 
from the point of view of its liberal defenders. I showed that the supposed necessity underlying 
its dual commitments, to activation and to workfare, was left underdetermined by the liberal 
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80 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Marginal Productivity Theory." Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 09 June 2006. Web. 02 May 2017.
argument and implicitly relied upon a commitment to reciprocity. Finally, discussing reciprocity 
in historical terms--its initial, specific purpose and its current, fraught status--I provided prima 
facie evidence for questioning its basis as a core tenet underlying the justification for workfare as 
necessary to a liberal welfare program. 
 In the next chapter, I will employ contemporary economics and accounting literature to 
bring more fully into focus the failure of the market to achieve reciprocity, as understood as a 
one-to-one correspondence between the value one creates and the value one receives in return. In 
doing so, I cast doubt on the notion that it is the economic sphere, and not political, that more 
fully realizes the liberal ideal of reciprocity. If Lockean property rights are instrumental towards 
communal good, and a political transfer of wealth can be made which both increases communal 
good, as well as does not overstep the principle of reciprocity, then the Lockean liberal fails to 
find recourse to object to its implementation.  
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VI. Reciprocity under Informational Capitalism
In this final chapter, I combine my previous discussions of the Lockean efficiency thesis and the 
liberal commitment to reciprocity with economic history past and present. In doing so, I show 
that remaining faithful to Lockean liberalism under modern conditions of production requires 
political redistribution of wealth like those entailed in the Periclean payments for social media 
usage.
 First I restate my contention that Locke instituted private property as instrumental 
towards the communal good. Defining this common good as increased efficiency of production 
(which under the wastage requirement will redound to society as a whole), I explain his position 
from a uniquely economic lens.  
 In light of this understanding, the choice to restrict the state’s wealth-transferring abilities 
to principles of reciprocity appears as a move--in line with Locke’s privileging of labor--to shift 
property titles from non-productive, rent-collecting landowners to productive, wage-earning 
laborers. Thus, reciprocity is instrumental towards achieving a greater correspondence of 
productive labor with remuneration. Insofar as it fails to do this, it loses validity.
 Finally, I will show that the specific form of private property rights which uphold many 
of the largest firms emerging today--intellectual property rights--fail to achieve reciprocity. 
Instead of placing ownership in the hands of productive labor, it places it into a small subset of 
productive laborers who are then able to case being productive, instead reaping rents from their 
ownership of a scarce resource. 
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 I will conclude by noting a popular policy response suggested by others who have 
discussed the injustice of intellectual property rights. While mine is similar in style, its emphasis 
on providing leisure for civic duty responds more directly to mine own plan in this project.
i . Land: Common v. Private
Debates have always raged regarding the morality of private property. While those in favor 
property generally argue it is necessary for an effective exploitation of natural resources, 
implying the morality of economic growth and the building of civilization, those opposed 
generally hold that the appropriation of land is a grave injustice to the natural condition of 
nature, man included. 
 For example, Rousseau once remarked to his fellow men that “you are lost if you forget 
that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one”(Rousseau 16). For him, not only 
is an unequal division of spoils--fruits-- illegitimate, but so is any initial parcelling out the earth. 
Lenin once famously demand that “private ownership of [estates] must be abolished immediately  
and without compensation”.81 These claims have not disappeared, and neither has their practice: 
about three-percent of Israelis live in kibbutz, cooperatives “founded on principles of communal 
ownership of property, social justice, and equality”.82
 Conversely, economist Ludwig von Mises, namesake of the libertarian Mises Institute, 
once declared that: “If history could teach us anything, it would be that private property is 
inextricably linked with civilization”.83 While Rousseau may not disagree--he admits that private 
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81 Lenin, V.I. Lenin: On the 'Unauthorised Seizure' of Land. Lenin Internet Archive, 1999. Web. 02 May 2017.
82 "About Kibbutz." Kibbutz Program Center. KPC, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
83 Mises, Ludwig Von. "Human Action." Mises Institute. Mises Institute, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
property was a precursor to civilization as we know it--he would likely object to the normative 
force Mises imports to civilization. The strength of his arguments have proven strong enough to 
convince Americans to privatize what would seem to be the least likely place for such activity: 
the government. In 1991, long before public outrage at the activities of for-profit-prisons, it was 
noted in the Harvard Business Review that “Over 11 states are now making use of privately built 
and operated correctional facilities; others plan to privatize roadways. At the local level, 
communities are turning to private operators to run their vehicle fleets, manage sports and 
recreation facilities, and provide transit service”.84 By placing the building of civilization as their 
end goal, these privatizers ignore the moral concerns of private ownership; if man is meant to 
build society, how can the step that allows him to do so--privatizing lands and goods--be 
immoral? 
 The two sides speak different languages. For the Rousseau and the communists, the act of 
privatization is a trespass on nature that no positive result can justify. For Mises and the 
capitalists, privatization is a necessary precursor to the building of a distinctly human nature--
civilization. Thus, they do not truly engage each other, but instead fall back into a dispute 
between nature versus culture. As I will show later, this allows Locke to embrace both sides. He 
both holds that the earth is by nature communal, but that communality can be abridged insofar as 
it achieves civilization. However, should communality no longer be an impediment to 
civilization building, or should building cease to be of import, private property loses its binding 
force. 
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84 Loveman, John B. GoodmanGary W. "Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?" Harvard Business Review. 
Harvard University, 01 Aug. 2014. Web. 02 May 2017.
 Before further expanding on Locke’s position, it would be helpful to understood exactly 
why private ownership is understood by capitalists as beneficial to efficient economic 
production. To do so, I once again turn to the Mises Institute. They are up to the task because, as 
their mission statement reads, they “seek a free-market capitalist economy and a private-property 
order that rejects taxation”.85
ii. Economic Justification of Private Property
For Mises economist Shawn Ritenour, the benefits of private property are threefold: the division 
of labor, the accumulation of capital, and the flourishing of entrepreneurship. He summarizes: 
Without private property there can be no voluntary exchange nor division of labor. Capitalists will be discouraged 
from saving and investment and entrepreneurs will lack the incentive to engage in profitable production.86
Let me briefly explain each of claim: 
1. Division of Labor- By placing the means of production87 in the hands of one firm or 
individual, others are forced to “voluntar[ily] exchange” their labor in order to in return employ 
these means to produce goods which can then be sold. This allows the owner of the means of 
production to determine-- based upon who she decides to exchange with--what position a laborer 
will occupy in the scheme of production. This increases production, according to Adam Smith, 
for three reasons: “the increase of dexterity in every particular workman,” the “saving of the time 
which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another,” and lastly “the 
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86 Ritenour, Shawn. "How Can Economic Law Help Us Fulfill the Cultural Mandate?" Institute For Faith, Work & 
Economics. TIFWE, 24 Sept. 2015. Web. 02 May 2017.
87 i.e.“The facilities and resources for producing goods.” "Means of Production." Oxford Living Dictionary. Oxford 
University Press, 2017. Web. 23 May 2017. 
invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor”(Smith 83). By 
giving the worker a single repeated task, the worker becomes a specialist. This allows him to 
better understand the task, relaying this knowledge to the engineer who then builds machinery to 
work in tandem. Private property thus creates a division of labor by creating unequal bargaining 
positions between laborers and the owners of the means of production which allows an owner to 
dictate a worker’s position in the scheme of production, creating a division of labor. This in turn 
creates conditions favorable to increasing productive efficiency through repetition and increased 
knowledge.
2. Accumulation of Capital- “For people to have the incentive to accumulate capital,” Ritenour 
states, they “must be secure in their property.”  Give property to one person, and that person 
gains incentive to earn profit from property because she will enjoy all that profit for herself. By 
allowing each individual to benefit exclusively from their own activity, private property utilizes 
each individual’s ambition towards their own economic gain to increases overall economic gain. 
Assured they will reap what they sow, producers give their utmost in sowing. 
3. Entrepreneurship- This is closely connected to (2), though with an added negative dimension: 
because it holds resource-owning individuals to “strict liability,” private property “helps prevent 
the destruction” of the means of production. For example, Ritenour states, private property holds 
“would-be polluters...accountable,” deterring landowners from pursuing activities detrimental to 
their environment. Not only are individuals able to benefit from the productive use of their 
resources as in (2) but they are held accountable for unproductive uses, incentivizing the former.  
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Once again, by giving the individual a stake in the exploitation of their resource, private property 
is said to encourage proper and efficient economic behavior. 
 
Thus, private property enhances economic productivity by: 1. creating a division of labor 
predicated upon differences in resource ownership, 2. allowing individuals to benefit from 
efficient production and, 3. making individuals responsible for inefficient production. We can 
collapse these distinction, however, into one primary engine of growth: individual responsibility 
for resource ownership. If one owns a resource, they are responsible for maintaining that 
resource in order to benefit from it, or face economic hardship. This applies both to owners of 
means of production as well as those who are forced to sell their labor, the difference being the 
resource which must be maintained: a piece of the world, or of the human body. This forces both 
the owner of the means of production to maintain his resource, as well as the laborer to sell his 
labor in order to earn a wage necessary for his upkeep, thus entering the division of labor. 
Therefore, private property creates responsibilities for resources which, although on the surface 
identical, are deeply different depending upon the resource owned--a means of production, or 
oneself.
 A distinction is made, however, between two different owners of the means of 
production: the landowner and the capitalist. The difference stems from the resource owned: land 
or capital88. When agriculture was the dominant mode of production, land was the most sought-
after resource. One’s wealth, to a large extent, depended upon how much land one had. Thus, the 
presence of the “landed gentry” and the fact that colonists in the South--much more dispersed 
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Press, 2017. Web. 23 May 2017
than those in the North--were much wealthier(Lindert and Williamson 1). At a certain point, 
however, agriculture was overtaken by industrial production which required primarily capital 
rather than land. What emerged was the capitalist, who owned means of production in the form 
of capital. Of course, land never ceased to be necessary, but instead required the existence of the 
capitalist as well, to place machines upon that land. The two forms of ownership continue to co-
exist. While they are analytically distinct, their difference is one of degree, not kind, as opposed 
to the gulf between them and the laborer.
iii. Sources of Income
Having detailed the economic justifications for private property, I will now turn to its results. 
Specifically, the streams of wealth that accrue to each individual depending upon their placement 
within this scheme of property as either owner of a means of production or of one’s own labor.  
The income received by each of these three groups, respectively, can be classified as: rent, profit, 
and wages. 
A. Rent (or ground rent) is the income received by a landowner simply in virtue of owning the 
land on which production occurs. While in his role as a landowner--as opposed to a farmer--
he is external to the process of production, he receives some proceeds of production because, 
in order for production to begin, he must be convinced to allow the use of his land. By taking 
to himself a resource necessary for all production, he mediates between the individual and 
their possibility of producing; he has expropriated to himself “the social conditions of 
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production.”89 Again, this expropriation in the case of land is understood as necessary for 
rational individuals to avoid the so-called “tragedy of the commons” wherein each individual 
actor takes from the resource out of self-interest until it is eradicated completely. By placing 
someone in charge of the resource, they are able assure--while in pursuit of their own self-
interest-- that the resource is used appropriately over time, and not immediately depleted as 
such.
B. Profit is the income that accrues to whomever invests their own capital. After purchasing 
labor and paying the rent for land, this individual receives income in the form of profit. This 
profit is the difference between the income made by the sale of the goods produced and the 
payments this capitalist owed to others for producing them. While at one point the profiteer 
was part of production--like the individual entrepreneur who runs her own business--she is 
increasingly distinct from the actual managing of production: the capitalist “can easily limit 
himself to providing the means of production,” like the rentier does with his land. Thus the 
capitalist, like the rentier, is exterior to the process of production.
C. Wage is the share of the products of industry received by labor for its work. Because wages 
are remuneration for laboring, and not for a product itself, wages are typically based upon 
time spent laboring. Crucially, this is the only income stream which goes to those who 
“furnish labor required by the technology embodied in capital assets”(Minsky 172). In other 
words, wage-earners are the only group which actually creates using the means of production. 
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reproduction”(Vasquez and Gonzales).
Thus only the wage earners are absolutely necessary, and not the product of contingent social 
relations. They are the “produce[rs] [of] the surplus-value90 that is at the origin of the 
production of both profit and rent”; their work pays for the incomes of those who are 
extraneous to production(Vercellone). While the two former classes are results of the 
particular legal scheme of private property, existing to ensure resources are used effectively, it  
is only this last class that is actually necessary to produce goods using those resources. The 
former acts as management, the latter as workers. 
To recap, we have found that the economic justification for private property rests upon the 
responsibility which it lays upon each individual to care for their own resources. Because 
individuals--or firms--are liable to shoulder the benefits of efficient production or suffer the 
consequences of inefficient production, it is assumed that individual’s ambitions and concern for 
their own well-being will drive them to undertake the former. With each citizen maximizing 
production to the best of their abilities out of self-love, economic growth is thereby maximized 
for society as a whole.
 We then distinguished between different kinds of resource-ownership, identifying the 
different streams of income which accrue to individuals for occupying each. We found that the 
groups which receive income due to ownership of private property outside of their own labor--
rentiers and profiteers--are extraneous to the actual production of goods. It is only the last group, 
wage-earners, owners of their own labor power, who are necessary to produce goods regardless 
of the particular scheme of property rights in place. Put more somberly: “capitalists [rentiers and 
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In that sense, “surplus value is generated by unpaid labor”(Fuchs 183). 
profiteers] are unproductive...they do not produce value...profit stems from the production of 
value by workers that is exploited and appropriated by capitalists”(Fuchs 184)(emphasis mine). 
iv. Locke & Property
In light of these distinctions, we can revisit and better categorize our two liberal commitments: 
the efficiency thesis and the principle of reciprocity. Specifically, I will show that Locke’s 
efficiency thesis was a result of his both holding that land was by nature communal, but also that 
appropriation was necessary so as to achieve greater production of goods. After reaffirming 
private property, however, the question of who was to be given private property--thus becoming 
rentiers and profiteers--was up for grabs. Locke, in connecting property to labor, and in 
restricting government payments to citizens to cases in which labor is received in return, was 
attempting to shift property titles from the unproductive aristocracy who were extraneous to 
production, to the productive workers necessary for production. His privileging of the economic 
sphere over the political in the distribution of wealth, therefore, was not an absolutist position but 
one meant to achieve greater reciprocity between one’s productivity and one’s remuneration. 
a. Communal Earth, Private Property
 As I remarked earlier, the debate over private property largely centers around which virtue is 
fundamental to the state: the prevention of injustice, defined as the appropriation of what should 
be communal land and resources, or increased productivity, understood as a necessary precursor 
to building civilization. Locke himself is divided, though liable to sacrifice the former for the 
latter. At one point, he directly acknowledges the communal nature of the earth: “God hath given 
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the world to men in common”(Locke 19). Still, he affirms that in order for an individual to 
benefit from a piece of this earth which they were given “another can no longer have any right to 
it”(Locke 19). Thus for Locke, Rousseau states an impossibility when he says “the fruits of the 
earth belong to all and the earth to no one.” It is only by belonging to some individual--following 
classical economic theory--that the earth can be made to bear its “fruit.” 
 Thus Locke asserts private property rights along with a spoilage limitation to gain the 
best of both worlds. While private ownership allows the earth to be made fruitful, the limitation 
upon spoilage ensures that this fruit, while not given to all equally, will at least go to those in 
need rather than spoil. Even for a communist, this is better than a situation in which no excess is 
produced, as we can assume Locke believed would be the case if private property were 
abolished. While indeed the earth along with its fruits belong to all, it is only by giving some 
ownership over that earth that its fruit can come into existence. And, while the owner gains the 
right to enjoy the fruits of her labor--as is necessary to achieve the responsibility which enables 
efficient production--she is bounded by certain rules, only able to accumulate gold and silver, not 
useful goods.
b. Private Property, Reciprocal Title
Private property was not a new phenomena when Locke was writing. As I showed, he left it in 
place despite his communitarian sympathies for purposes of economic growth. What he did not 
leave in place was to whom this ownership of land was to be accorded. In England, his home, 
land title was accorded based on political privilege: “most farmers did not own the land they 
cultivated but leased it from a small group of landowners, mostly members of the 
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aristocracy”(Arnold-Baker 323). This practice began in 1236 with the Statute of Merton which 
established “the right of lords of the manor to enclose commons and waste lands.”91 Thus while 
preserving a right to private property, Locke altered its foundation. Rather than political title--
once justified as being due to royalty’s being descended from Adam--he places it within the 
economic sphere as a result of performing labor. In doing so, he shifts ownership of the means of 
production from rentiers, who owned property for political reasons, to the wage laborers, who 
received income from their productive activities. In other words, he moved the ownership of land 
from the non-productive class external to production to the class which produces actual surplus-
value through work--the laborers. He did this by connecting property title to the individual’s 
ability to labor for consumption, and nothing else. 
c. Locke’s Economics
We can characterize Locke’s private property arguments--understood according to the efficiency 
thesis--as follows: 
1. A continuation of private property due to practical economic concerns.
2. A spoilage requirement to ensure the excess production enabled by private property redounds to society as a 
whole.
3. A moving of ownership title from the non-productive rentier class to the productive laboring class.
The necessity of holding governments to the principle of reciprocity is clear. To ensure (3), or, 
the granting of value in the form of property titles to the laborer, and not the rentier, Locke 
formulated a direct connection between the state’s ability to grant wealth--in this case through a 
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protected property title--and labor performed by the individual for the state. In doing so, he 
invalidated any purely political ascription of property title to aristocrat--as was the case in 
England-- unless that aristocrat was prepared to work for his keep, an unlikely scenario. Thus 
reciprocity was meant, within the framework of private property, to ensure the shift of property 
titles from non-productive to productive labor. While including labor as a necessary prerequisite 
for earning property created this link in the first place, reciprocity was meant as a check on 
government action to prevent its being overridden in favor of aristocrats. 
v. From Land to Capital
Land ceased to be the dominant resource once the Industrial Revolution and its factory systems 
took hold. Replacing the combination of man and land found in agriculture, the factory placed 
the machine between the two. Another resource, capital, in the form of the wealth necessary to 
acquire machines or just machines themselves, became the dominant means of production. 
 When capital took hold, a similar debate to the one over the morality of privately owned 
land occurred. Before 1933, America’s monetary system was a gold standard, restricting the level 
of capital within the economy to a certain proportion with the amount of gold held by the nation . 
The means of production were no longer naturally restricted, but artificially so. To that end, 
labor-friendly politician William Jennings Bryan relayed at the 1896 Democratic Convention: 
Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the 
laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer [investors’] demand for a gold standard by saying to 
them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a 
cross of gold.92
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Like Locke, Bryan is siding with productive over non-productive labor, the wage-earner over the 
profiteer. Rather than call for the title of ownership to means of production be moved from one 
class to the other, Bryan seeks the expansion of the artificially scarce means of production so that 
profiteers cease to exist. Similarly, J.M. Keynes once called for the expansion of capital and 
thereby the “euthanasia of the rentier” or, of the “cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to 
exploit the scarcity-value of capital” which allows her to dictate the division of labor and the 
collection of profits(Cate 24). The discussion has come a long way; where Rousseau argued 
against appropriation, these more modern figures restrict themselves to calling for the expansion 
of the existing means. 
 The Mises Institute is not mum on this point either, declaring their rejection of Bryan’s 
proposed “monetary debasement” as their second highest priority.93 For Mises himself, the 
printing of capital makes the delivering of new, less valuable dollars to fulfill a preexisting 
contract akin to “what it would be if you agreed to deliver a horse to another party but instead of 
a horse you delivered a chicken, saying, ‘This is all right ... I say that this chicken means a 
horse’”(Mises 12). By increasing the level of capital, and making it easier to acquire means of 
production, government allows “individuals [to]...fail to fulfill promises they have made”(Mises 
14).
  The question is once again one of responsibility: if the individual knows it will become 
easier over time to acquire cash, she may sign contracts which initially appear difficult to fulfill, 
relying upon this expectation of later ease. If so, the individual is much less on the hook to bear 
the brunt of any potential default of their contract; their incentive to produce effectively is 
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diminished. Bryan of course doesn’t share Mises’ concern for a lack of incentive to produce; his 
constituents, as he refers to them, are “toilers.” However, following economic doctrine, Mises 
rejects monetary expansion because it decreases absolute individual responsibility, thereby 
dampening the ability of personal ambition to fuel the economy. 
vi. From Capital to Knowledge
No longer agriculture or manufacturing, but “immaterial labor” is “increasingly recognized as 
the principal source of value in the contemporary economy”(Spence and Carter 304). Immaterial 
labor is defined as “labour which creates immaterial products such as knowledge, information, 
communications or relationships,” typically breaking down into categories of either intellectual 
labor or service work(Spence and Carter 305). While autonomous machines increasingly take 
over the sphere of direct production, labor becomes “linguistic acts, a sequence of assertions, and 
a symbolic interaction” to regulate, surveil, and coordinate the labor performed by physical 
machinery (Lucarelli and Fumagalli 77). 
 Consider the three most popular jobs in the U.S. in 2013 according to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics: salesperson, cashier, and food service. All three regulate customer’s purchases 
of goods produced elsewhere, while providing  “customer service with a smile.”  Labor is less 
demanding physically than it is emotionally. Or, consider the field of coding and software 
production--the top-five companies in the U.S. by market cap94 all produce extensive software--
which is less physically demanding than it is intellectually. While these types of jobs have 
always existed, it is their increasing prevalence that causes many to refer to the oncoming stage 
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of capitalism as “informational capitalism,” with “information jobs” in 2010 already making up 
47.9% of all wage labor in the U.S. (Fuchs 180). The primary means of production are no longer 
land or capital, but the accumulation of and expropriation of knowledge. 
 P.F. Drucker describes this method of production as the application of knowledge “to 
knowledge itself”(Drucker 60). As opposed to industrial production, in which worker’s 
movements were studied so as to improve their efficiency, it is now data which is being studied 
so as to improve overall efficiency. For example, Google uses the data it collects on individual 
habits so as to better coordinate its search function, improving its product. Similarly, Uber uses 
the data it collects on cab requests to alter its pricing to better coordinate supply and demand95. It  
is these companies’ ability to compile data in one location--Google by serving as a portal to the 
web, Uber by acting as the meeting place of exchange between taxi drivers and would-be riders--
and then serve up that data effectively that makes them so valuable. 
 Uber provides a good example of the primary types of jobs the informational economy 
offers: complex problem solving--the software engineers--and service work--the drivers. 
Importantly, both rely upon knowledge: the former theoretical knowledge, the latter emotional 
knowledge. The latter can be seen in riders’ ability to rate their driver’s quality: “social skills and 
a ‘good attitude’” are demanded from “workers in all spheres”(Spence and Carter 305). 
 What both these qualities have in common is that their production is not limited to the 
workplace--certainly coders come in with knowledge of software, and drivers the ability to deal 
with humans--but occurs within what some call the “social factory”(Spence and Carter 305). 
This is simply recognition that knowledge, in whatever form, is not simply the result of on-the-
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job training as, say, machinists’ work is, but is garnered throughout human experience. This 
“recognition of the General Intellect96 as the main source of value in capitalism causes us to 
rethink the boundaries between work and life”(Spence and Carter 307). It also helps us to 
understand the current movement toward work-life balance97; rather than a conciliation to the 
laborer, it is an understanding by business that increasingly, what happens outside the office 
contributes to what happens within. Thus, the growing prominence of knowledge within 
capitalism--both theoretical and emotional--leads to the understanding that work is, in a certain 
sense, always being performed. If the brain is one’s resource, one never ceases to refine it; fixed 
capital, or, the means of production, are “man himself”(Drucker 61).
  Noting the fact that knowledge is socially produced and yet individually expropriated 
through intellectual property rights, Christian Fuchs writes: 
In informational capitalism, knowledge has become a productive force, but knowledge is produced not only in corporations in the 
form of knowledge goods, but also in everyday life, for example, by parents who educate their children; citizens who engage in 
everyday politics; consumers of media who produce social meaning and hence are prosumers; users of MySpace, YouTube, 
Facebook, and similar sites, who produce informational content that is appropriated by capital; radio listeners and television 
viewers who call in live on air to discuss with studio guests and convey their ideas that are instantly commodified in the real-time 
economy, and so on. The production process of knowledge is a social, common process, but knowledge is appropriated by 
capital. (Fuchs 186)(emphasis mine)
With this in mind, he goes on to state that within information capitalism, “nobody is 
unproductive since each human being is producing and reproducing the commons appropriated 
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quote from Harney 2007).
97 “Work-life balance is a term that is thrown around a lot these days” Thompson, Melissa. "How One Tech 
Company Is Reinventing Work-Life Balance." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017
by capital,” referring to the social milieu which allows knowledge creation and dissemination as 
the “commons”(Fuchs 193)(emphasis mine). 
 We have come full circle from Rousseau. The means of production, here knowledge 
rather than land, is decried by labor-sympathetic authors to be the property of all, not some. 
While for Rousseau this is because the earth is held in common, for Fuchs and others, this is 
because the world of knowledge is made in common: “in a knowledge society, social life 
becomes productive”(Fuchs 193). This results from the nature of knowledge, as it disperses and 
grows through human contact. 
 Fuchs then identifies two classes of workers within this scheme: direct knowledge 
workers, such as coders, who produce the knowledge goods which are then patented by firms 
and sold to consumers, and indirect knowledge workers who produce the “social conditions” 
necessary for this knowledge accumulation such as teachers, student, parents, friends, and others 
who add to understanding, both theoretical and emotional(Fuchs 186). While both labor, only the 
former are paid in the form of rents for appropriating from this intellectual “commons,” through 
the use of patents and intellectual property rights (IPRs), while the the latter are forced to endure 
precarious employment. 
 Returning to Locke, it seems clear that IPRs do not serve the same ends which he had set 
for private property. Specifically, it does not increase reciprocity by creating a more direct link 
between labor and ownership, but instead decreases that link by cutting out “‘the collaboration 
and coordination of a multitude of agents’” in favor of a single individual or entity who is then 
appropriated title (Vazquez and Gonzalez). Rather than shifting title from non-productive to 
productive labor, it shifts it from one group of productive laborers--society generally--to another, 
108
select individuals who apply for patents. Thus, IPRs continue the practice of private property, 
and thereby rent, while decreasing reciprocity by failing to give property titles to productive 
laborers--society at large. 
vii. Conclusion
If, as I have shown, the modern economy fails to respond to reciprocity, then Locke’s 
justifications for restricting government transfers to the principle of reciprocity--meant to keep 
property titles in the hands of productive labor--is thrown in doubt. While for many authors, 
recognition of the shared nature of knowledge production implies the necessity of a universal 
basic income so as to compensate for the “literal theft” that is IPRs (Spence and Carter), I would 
take a different route. 
 If, as seems likely to continue to be the case, IPRs are granted, then we should hold those 
who appropriate the “General Intellect” to the same standard upon which we hold those who 
appropriate land--they are responsible for its care. In the case of land, this means that, should 
they destroy the land, they have lost their property. In the case of social knowledge this means 
that, should they appropriate the work of society at large, they must simultaneously ensure the 
continuation of a society capable of producing increased knowledge by enabling individuals to 
obtain the economic security and leisure time conducive to gaining an intellectual and emotional 
intelligence. Thus, my argument comes full circle. The provision of leisure through income 
which allows individuals to partake in social media, calming the storms of dissent, is the same 
governmental policy which Locke would propose in the face of informational capitalism. 
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